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ABSTRACT 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) dynamically addresses unique community issues in a 
way that allows police departments to be cost-effective and efficient. POP draws upon 
routine activities and rational choice theories, at times incorporating elements of crime 
prevention through environmental design. A recent systematic review found POP to be 
hugely popular, but not rigorously assessed or implemented. In 2009, the Glendale, 
Arizona Police Department and researchers from Arizona State University received 
funding through the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s (BJA) Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) 
to target crime at convenience stores through a problem-oriented policing approach. The 
Glendale SPI team devised an approach that mirrored the ideals put forth by Goldstein 
(1990), and provided a thorough undertaking of the SARA model. A comprehensive 
response plan was developed with several proposed responses, including: intervention 
with Circle K leadership, suppression, and prevention at the six highest-activity stores. 
Despite a thorough POP implementation, the initial descriptive evaluation of the Glendale 
SPI reported positive effects on crime, but left questions about the intervention’s long-
term impact on convenience store crime in Glendale, Arizona. The policy and theoretical 
influence of the initiative warrants a more rigorous evaluation. Supplanting the original 
assessment, a difference in difference model, negative binomial regression, and relative 
effect size are calculated to ascertain the SPI’s long-term effects on target and 
comparison stores. Phi and weighted displacement quotient are calculated to determine 
the existence of displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits. Overall, results indicate 
support for the project’s effectiveness on crime reduction. Further, none of the six 
intervention stores experienced crime displacement. Five of the six stores, however, 
  ii  
experienced a diffusion of benefits in the surrounding 500-yard area; that is, a crime 
reduction was observed at the intervention stores and in the surrounding areas of five of 
these stores. Disorder and property crimes at the targeted stores were most affected by the 
intervention. One of the intervention stores did experience an increase in violent crime, 
however. Future studies should strengthen the methodological design when evaluating 
POP projects and seek to flesh out more precisely the crime control effects of unique 
problem-oriented strategies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Problem-oriented policing dynamically addresses unique community issues in a 
way that allows police departments to be cost-effective and efficient. Herman Goldstein 
put forth the concept of problem-oriented policing (POP) in 1979, which sought to 
address the “means over ends” syndrome that was plaguing the police. This refers to 
organizations being so preoccupied with the methods of operation (i.e., internal 
efficiency) that they lose sight of their purpose. To illustrate this anomic problem, 
Goldstein (1979) cited an example from a newspaper in the United Kingdom: 
Complaints from passengers wishing to use the Bagnall to Greenfields bus 
service that “the drivers were speeding past the queues of up to 30 people 
with a smile and a wave of a hand” have been met by a statement pointing 
out that “it is impossible for the drivers to keep their timetable if they have 
to stop for passengers.” (p. 236) 
 
By taking on an internally focused, triage approach, the police were acting like the bus 
drivers; handling incidents as quickly as possible, without solving the underlying 
problem. POP aims to redirect police attention to problems and not incidents, in turn 
addressing the causes of crime and disorder and not just symptoms (Goldstein, 1990). 
POP can be implemented via the SARA process (scanning, analysis, response, and 
assessment) (Eck & Spelman, 1987), which is a commonly used problem-solving method 
that implores police to “work smarter, not harder” (Stewart, 1985). The SARA model is 
built on several problem-oriented themes: increased effectiveness and attention to 
underlying issues, expertise and creativity in developing innovative solutions, and police-
community involvement to ensure citizen satisfaction. The four stages of SARA are a 
strategic response to the limitations of incident-driven policing. POP is a more in-depth 
approach than previous police tactics (including reactive, proactive, and community-
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oriented strategies) (Cordner & Biebel, 2005), and is vital if the police want to maintain a 
prevention role in crime (Eck, 2006). 
In a recent systematic review, Weisburd and colleagues (2008) found POP to be 
hugely popular, but not rigorously assessed. Only ten studies met their methodological 
criteria, which included experimental and quasi-experimental designs with comparison 
groups. Even when relaxing their inclusion criteria, they were only able to assess a total 
of 55 POP initiatives (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010). The lack of high quality 
POP evaluations is stark considering Weisburd et al. (2010) initially identified over 5,500 
POP related projects. The issues with methodological rigor are often compounded 
because of implementation problems. Braga and Weisburd (2006), for example, have 
criticized POP in practice, suggesting that several elements of the model are implemented 
weakly, including: shallow problem analysis, an over-reliance on crime control 
responses, and a tendency to be weak on collaboration (also see: Cordner, 1998; Scott, 
2000). In short, problem-oriented policing may be enormously popular, but in practice its 
implementation is often not consistent with Goldstein’s vision, and its evaluation often 
does not meet rigorous standards. As a result, the true value of POP as a crime-control 
strategy remains unclear. 
 In 2009, the Glendale, Arizona Police Department and researchers from Arizona 
State University received funding through the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s (BJA) 
Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) to target crime at convenience stores through a problem-
oriented policing approach. The Glendale SPI team devised an approach that mirrored the 
ideals put forth by Goldstein (1990), and provided a thorough undertaking of the SARA 
model. To begin the intensive SARA process, researchers from Arizona State University 
  3 
trained Glendale Police Department personnel on in depth-POP; these training sessions 
exceeded twenty hours of classroom-based instruction. Convenience store crime was 
chosen during the problem identification, or scanning, phase “because the problem was 
chronic (tied to persistently high property crime rates), because it placed a significant 
burden on police resources, and because it threatened the safety of both customers and 
store employees” (White & Katz, 2013, p. 306). During the analysis phase all calls for 
service at convenience stores were examined. It was then discovered that calls for service 
were disproportionately occurring at Circle K stores. In 2010, Glendale’s 15 Circle K’s 
(23% of all convenience stores) represented 79% of the calls for service at convenience 
stores (White & Katz, 2013). The analysis phase also explored the causes of the 
disproportionality through geographic analysis, interviews of key stakeholders, and 
evaluations of the structural, social, and administrative environment of Circle Ks and 
other convenience stores. The majority of crimes being committed at these stores 
involved thefts of merchandise, thefts of gas, fights, disorderly conduct, panhandling, and 
robberies. Ultimately, the Glendale SPI team concluded that Circle K management 
practices were largely responsible for the crime problem (White & Balkcom, 2012). 
A comprehensive response plan was developed with several targeted strategies, 
including: intervention with Circle K leadership, crime suppression, and prevention 
efforts at the six highest-activity stores. The team assessed their multi-pronged approach 
and found mixed results. Circle K was generally not responsive to the intervention 
recommendations, and did not alter their practices. White and Balkcom (2012) noted 
“...the Glendale team experienced resistance from Circle K management. Straightforward 
CPTED recommendations were often ignored, especially those that required a financial 
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commitment” (p. 6). The SPI team responded by creating a law enforcement working 
group that included agencies from neighboring cities (White & Balkcom, 2012). This 
working group created a collective voice in speaking to Circle K, and increased leverage 
on the corporate leadership (White & Balkcom, 2012). The SPI team’s second response 
was to publicly shame Circle K by presenting the findings to the local media (White & 
Balkcom, 2012). This tactic was successful in getting Circle K re-engaged in discussing 
the problem and modifying their practices (White & Balkcom, 2012).  
The methodology employed by White and Katz (2013) for the assessment phase 
of the SPI was descriptive, examining changes in mean calls for service over time at all 
65 convenience stores in Glendale. There were statistically significant drops in calls for 
service at five of the six target Circle K stores (White & Katz, 2013). Calls for service at 
nine non-SPI Circle K stores in Glendale also experienced a drop in crime, but these 
findings were not statistically significant (White & Katz, 2013). The experiences of 
several other non-Circle K convenience stores in the sample varied. Some of these stores 
had significant increases in calls for service, and other had significant declines. Although 
White and Katz (2013) concluded that the Smart Policing Initiative led to significant 
declines in crime and disorder at the targeted convenience stores, the authors specifically 
called for a more sophisticated and longer-term analysis, likely time series, to offer a 
more detailed picture of the intervention. 
Based on the aforementioned research problems, this dissertation seeks to 
understand the effect of the Glendale SPI on the nature and prevalence of crime at six 
target Circle K stores. This is done by comparing changes in crime at target Circle K 
stores to changes in crime at non-target convenience stores. Additionally, an assessment 
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of crime over time surrounding the target Circle K stores will be conducted. If crime in 
adjacent areas is found to have changed over time, either displacement or diffusion of 
benefits will be ascertained. These questions will be explored using all calls for service at 
all convenience stores in Glendale, Arizona from January 2008 to October 2013. This 
extends the initial analyses (August 2009 to July 2012) by 35 months, or an almost three 
year increase. The impact of the intervention will be assessed using a difference in 
difference estimator, a negative binomial regression model to account for overdispersion, 
independent samples t-tests to ascertain individual store effects, and relative effect size. A 
descriptive model that depicts crime type over time will allow for a better understanding 
of the nature of the crime occurring at the Circle K stores. Lastly, a 500-yard catchment 
area will be assessed around the Circle K stores to investigate the potential for 
displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits. 
Implementation of the Glendale SPI avoided the traditional pitfalls of prior POP 
efforts, as all elements of the SARA model were robustly employed. The evaluation 
conducted by White and Katz (2013) is consistent with recent meta-analysis findings on 
POP produced by Weisburd and colleagues (2008; 2010). White and Katz’s evaluation is 
technically more sophisticated and adheres more closely to the SARA model than most 
POP projects, but the methodological rigor leaves room for questions about the 
intervention’s impact. Because POP projects tend to be weakly implemented and 
assessed, it is imperative that this intervention is included in future analyses capturing the 
impact of POP as it is perhaps one of the best implementations of the SARA model to 
date. More troubling still, the POP and SARA paradigms are very highly regarded in 
policing research and practice. Millions of dollars and hours of work go into creating 
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problem-oriented interventions, yet only 8 of the 10 POP projects included in Weisburd’s 
analysis reported findings in favor of problem-oriented policing; and these projects had 
widely varying effects. The limited positive findings in this area raise concerns about the 
effectiveness and utility of problem-oriented policing. A troubling lack of rigorous 
research on POP also limits its inclusion in the evidence-based paradigm that is highly 
influential on the current state of policing policy and research. Further, the Glendale SPI 
was initially assessed using calls for service data from August 2009-July 2012. The 
current assessment includes data from January 2008-October 2013, extending far beyond 
the projects’ grant period. This longer time series can more clearly parse out if the 
intervention’s impact was a result of any short-term fluctuations in crime in Glendale, or 
if the results support the assertion that the POP project indeed had a sustainable impact 
on convenience store crime. 
None of the studies examined in Weisburd et al. (2008) reported standardized 
effect sizes, highlighting a more general theme of lack of transparency and reporting 
validity in crime and justice studies (Farrington, 2006; Lösel & Köferl, 1989). 
Additionally, there is usually not enough information in published problem-oriented 
policing studies, including White and Katz (2013), to calculate an effect size (Weisburd 
et al., 2008). Without a calculable effect size, inclusion in meta-analysis is nearly 
impossible. By calculating and reporting the treatment effect of the Glendale SPI, this 
dissertation will add to the literature on POP and lessen the problem of reporting validity 
in academic research. The secondary question addressed in this dissertation focuses on 
the existence of displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits resulting from the 
Glendale SPI, which are still contentious and debated phenomena in crime and place 
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research. Additionally, changes in crime type will be examined – research in this area is 
almost nonexistent. 
Lastly, while several of the studies assessed in Weisburd et al. (2008) give 
credence to the existence of POP’s impact on crime and place (including hot spots), none 
directly examined convenience stores. Although problem-oriented policing encourages 
unique solutions to specific community problems, convenience stores are omnipresent in 
the United States and are generally considered risky places (Eck, Clarke, & Guerette, 
2007). At the start of 2014 there were 151,282 convenience stores in America, or one 
convenience store for approximately every 2,100 United States residents (National 
Association of Convenience Stores, 2014). The ubiquity of convenience stores and their 
susceptibility to crime has led to a large body of research on convenience stores as crime 
generators (e.g., Bellamy, 1996; Calder & Bauer, 1992; Crow & Bull, 1975; D’Alessio & 
Stolzenberg, 1990; Duffala, 1976; Erickson & Stenseth, 1996; Exum, Kuhns, Koch, & 
Johnson, 2010; Faulkner, Landsittel, & Hendricks, 2001; Hunter & Jeffrey, 1997; 
Petrosino & Brensilber, 2003; Petrosino, Fellow, & Brensilber, 1992; White & Katz, 
2013). Convenience stores share a set of unique characteristics (including layout, 
operation hours, etc.) (Altizio & York, 2007) that may result in the Glendale SPI being 
reproducible. If this Glendale problem-oriented policing intervention can be replicated to 
produce positive results in other locations, it will add a new dimension to the utility of 
POP’s policy impact. 
Research Questions 
Question 1: Did the POP intervention generate an effect on crime at the target Circle K 
stores, compared to the non-target stores? 
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Question 1a: What was the strength and duration of the SPI intervention’s effects? 
Question 2: Did crime change over time in the area surrounding the target Circle K 
stores? If so, does this finding suggest displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits? 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
History of Police Patrol 
Due to their ambiguous role in society, the police have assumed multiple 
responsibilities (Goldstein, 1979, 1990; Kelling & Moore, 1988; Manning, 1978, 1992). 
The defined mission of policing is varied. According to Bittner, the capacity to use force 
is the core function of the police (1970). Other definitions reflect a grimmer perception. 
Fagan and Davies (2000), for example, suggest that policing is about the monitoring and 
maintenance of poor people in poor places. Herbert (2014) recently suggested that the 
police represent “the now-expected insertion of state authority into the flow of everyday 
life” (p. 580). Manning (1978) believed the police to have an impossible mandate, which 
they largely imposed on themselves. Manning (1978) elaborates on this point. 
To much of the public, the police are seen as alertly ready to respond to 
citizen demands, as crime-fighters, as an efficient, bureaucratic, highly 
organized force that keeps society from falling into chaos. The policeman 
himself considers the essence of his role to be the dangerous and heroic 
enterprise of crook-catching and the watchful prevention of crimes... In an 
effort to gain the public’s confidence in their ability, and to insure thereby 
the solidarity of their mandate, the police have encouraged the public to 
continue thinking of them and their work in idealized terms, terms, that is, 
which grossly exaggerate the actual work done by police... The public’s 
definitions have been converted by the police organization into distorted 
criteria for promotion, success, and security. (p. 12-13) 
 
Several scholars have noted that the police have evolved over time through several 
stages, each with corresponding goals and strategies to achieve those goals. Since the 
creation of the modern police, with the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, it is 
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generally agreed upon that the principal function of patrol has been to reduce crime and 
maintain feelings of public safety. Innovations in patrol and policing strategies since that 
time have had large impacts on crime. For example, innovations in policing strategies are 
consistently among the most cited reasons for the 1990s crime decline (Levitt, 2004). 
There is a consensus among the police and academics that the history of policing can be 
organized into three eras: the political era, the professional era, and the community 
problem-solving era (Kelling & Moore, 1988).1 Each era is characterized across seven 
dimensions: legitimacy, function, organizational design, external relationships, demand, 
methods, and outcome. A review of this era-based history, and of the evolving role of the 
police over time, provides an important backdrop for the current study. Table 1 provides 
an overview of this history and its evolution. 
The Political Era 
Early American policing was greatly influenced by the London Metropolitan 
Police model (Reisig, 2010). Several principles were disseminated to new London 
officers in 1829, attributed2 to Robert Peel. These Peelian principles, according to 
Germann, Day, and Gallati (1968), are as follows: 
(1) The police must be stable, efficient, and organized along military lines. 
(2) The police must be under government control. (3) The absence of 
crime will best prove the efficiency of police. (4) The distribution of crime 
news is essential. (5) The deployment of police strength both by time and 
area is essential. (6) No quality is more indispensable to a policeman than 
                                                        
1 Some have levied heavy criticism at this framework. See for example: Strecher (1991); 
Walker (1984); Williams and Murphy (1990). 
2 Lentz and Chaires (2007) are not able to find an original list of principles compiled by 
Peel. Additionally, subsequent lists of the Peelian principles of policing vary between, 
usually, 9 and 12 principles. Despite most lists having similar themes and values, the 
authors attribute the discrepancies to new concepts or clarifications being imposed by 
each unique author. 
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a perfect command of temper; a quiet, determined manner has more effect 
than violent action. (7) Good appearance commands respect. (8) The 
securing and training of proper persons is at the root of efficiency. (9) 
Public security demands that every police officer be given a number. (10) 
Police headquarters should be centrally located and easily accessible to the 
people. (11) Policemen should be hired on a probationary basis. (12) 
Police records are necessary to the correct distribution of police strength. 
(pp. 60-61) 
 
Policing scholars believe these principles to be an indication of a shift toward rational 
policing (Lentz & Chaires, 2007), and essentially the birth of modern public policing 
(LaGrange, 1993). U.S. agencies began developing twenty years later, adopting many 
(but not all) aspects of the Peel model. In the U.S., local municipalities, and local political 
leaders, were the source of police legitimacy and authorization during this time (see 
Table 1). Consequently, the police and politicians were closely linked during this era 
(Fogelson, 1977), providing ample opportunity for corruption to result (Kelling & Moore, 
1988). The police function was varied, calling for officers’ involvement in crime 
prevention and control, as well as the provision of social services (e.g., helping with job 
placement, and running soup lines) (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Lane, 1980). Police during 
this time were de-centrally organized,3 although still maintaining an ostensible quasi-
military status and unified chain of command (Kelling & Moore, 1988). This, in 
conjunction with “primitive communication and transportation,” gave police unchecked 
discretion in handling the public (Kelling & Moore, 1988). There were no selection 
standards for police, no training, and no accountability. Violence was typically used to 
administer street justice and induce compliance (Haller, 1975). 
                                                        
3 Kelling and Moore (1988) state that the political era saw police departments divided up 
and run as smaller-scale departments, incapable of adequately supervising officers. This 
type of division often results in overlap, with de-central organization being characterized 
by a duplication of police services and conflicting jurisdiction. 
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Discriminatory laws were created during this time (largely aimed at immigrant 
neighborhoods) (Fogelson, 1977).4 The close relationships between police and lawmakers 
forced officers to enforce these laws, despite their unpopularity (Fogelson, 1977; Kelling 
& Moore, 1988). Close relationships with community members, and broad discretionary 
powers, led to a dysfunctional climate. Police were considered “inefficient, corrupt, and 
discriminatory” (Reisig, 2010, p. 12). Foot patrol was the primary patrol method during 
this time (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Lane, 1980). Technology was limited in the political 
era, but call boxes and automobiles did emerge and altered the range of coverage among 
officers (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The police focused on people, not crimes, during this 
period (Eck, 1984; Kelling & Moore, 1988); that is, the police relied on informants to 
identify other criminals, and gathered information on these individuals for political, and 
not offense-related, purposes (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The nature of the era dictated that 
political and citizen satisfaction were important, expected outcomes (Kelling & Moore, 
1988). Limitations of the political strategy made it so that these goals were not effectively 
met. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 Upper-class native Americans (i.e., not European immigrants) were upset by the values 
held by immigrant and lower-class communities during this time, and campaigned to curb 
the vice they associated with these groups (Fogelson, 1977). For example, laws were 
passed to prohibit gambling, prostitution, and business on Sundays (Fogelson, 1977). 
These laws were regarded as “unreasonable, inequitable, and unenforceable” (Fogelson, 
1977, p. 20). 
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The Professional Era 
By the turn of the century, police leaders were unhappy with the first 50 years of 
policing in the United States – which was characterized by corruption, partisan influence, 
and overall disorganization. Earlier reform efforts of the progressives had failed. 
With the end of the political era came the rise of the professional model, and preventive 
patrol. August Vollmer (1936), an early police reformer, called for a more efficient, 
nonpartisan police force with rigorous selection standards and training (see also: Fosdick, 
1915; Fuld, 1909). Vollmer also suggested that all police responsibilities be stripped 
away, except for crime control efforts. Previous attempts at reform, mostly based on 
contempt over political influence corrupting the police mandate, had failed (Kelling & 
Moore, 1988). Around this time, J. Edgar Hoover was overhauling the Bureau of 
Investigation into a prestigious organization – the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
Hoover developed favorable public relations between the public and the FBI, and 
generally increased the bureau’s perceived and actual competency (Kelling & Moore, 
1988). Shortly thereafter, O. W. Wilson, inspired by his mentor and Berkeley police chief 
Vollmer, as well as Hoover’s efforts with the FBI, continued to promote the police 
reform organizational strategy (Wilson, 1950). 
 The rationale for these innovative changes was based on classical organization 
theory (Reisig, 2010), with a desire for rational and efficient organizational behavior 
driving this paradigm (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). This era sought to change the basis of 
police legitimacy and authorization by isolating police from political influence and 
making them more autonomous (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Additionally, increased police 
professionalism (including selection standards, training, and internal efficiency) became 
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the central focus of legitimacy (Kelling & Moore, 1988). As a consequence of these new 
organizational objectives, the police function naturally shifted. The police function 
became one of crime control and criminal apprehension; reconceptualized as law 
enforcement (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The police embraced this new mission, and 
during the 1950s and 1960s expressed disdain for deviations from this new orientation. 
Police were still involved in community affairs and order maintenance, but they were not 
enthused about what they identified as secondary, social work tasks (Kelling & Moore, 
1988). 
As aforementioned, the new police organizational design reflected classical 
theory. This theory posits that workers are not self-motivated, and as such, management 
needs to provide economic incentives to motivate workers (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The 
theory also calls for a greater division of labor and centralized control. Patrol became 
standardized, and police management attempted to limit officers’ discretion (Kelling & 
Moore, 1988). Specialized units were created as needed, further centralizing command. 
This new professional model also distanced police from citizens, as crime control and 
crime solving were the new police objectives (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Despite this, the 
police were now omnipresent because of motorized patrol. The emergence of calls for 
service in the 1930s, or the end of the political era and beginning of the reform era, 
brought with it an expectation that the police would respond to citizens’ calls (Walker, 
1992). In 1968, these responses were expected to be rapid once the 9-1-1 emergency call 
system was implemented (Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990). New advances like these 
helped to further centralize the police function. The community heard messages on the 
radio from the police encouraging citizens to use the new rapid response systems. Rapid 
  15 
response to calls for service by automobile and preventive patrol became the de facto 
modes of police response (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Technology, in various ways, had 
streamlined the efficiency of the police. 
The push toward greater operating efficiency gathered momentum as 
various new technologies (in motor vehicles, telephone systems, radio 
communications, data processing equipment, and ultimately computers) 
were adapted to police work. Thus, for several decades (especially 1940 
through 1970), a concern with developing techniques to increase the 
control and efficiency of the police agency occupied those in the forefront 
of policing. (Goldstein, 1990, p. 7) 
 
When they were not responding to emergency calls for service, the police were 
implementing random preventive patrol by car (Braga & Weisburd, 2010). Wilson 
(1950), drawing on Peel’s early principles, first theorized that the rationale behind this 
patrol effort was one of pervasive deterrence – police would remain visible throughout 
communities. This omnipresence would result in both criminal deterrence and public 
reassurance, while simultaneously allowing the police to be more efficient at criminal 
apprehension (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Despite this axiom, resources were 
disproportionately allocated (Braga & Weisburd, 2010), and some worried that 
preventive patrol was simply displacing crime due to its focus in certain areas (Reppetto, 
1976a). That is, crime prevention efforts were just moving crime instead of reducing or 
eliminating it. Even though the police recognized that crime concentrated in certain 
places, to combat concerns of displacement they further continued with the random 
preventive patrol strategy (Larson, 1972; Wilson, 1963). This focus on internal efficiency 
is where Goldstein’s “means over ends” syndrome began. The reactive, triage approach 
that emerged shifted police attention away from the original mission – to solve problems. 
The bureaucratic model emphasizes numeric indicators of performance (internally). 
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Consequently, police were handling each call as quickly as possible rather than solving 
the problem and understanding the cause. Because of the many positive improvements in 
policing the reform era brought about, it was not until the late 1960s that the professional 
model was questioned (Goldstein, 1979; Goldstein, 1990). 
The 1960s and 1970s were a time of great transition for criminology, criminal 
justice, and society in general. There was much civil unrest during this time, and police 
practices became associated with urban riots and minority mistreatment (Reisig, 2010). 
“If police practices were not already a subject of grievance, police responses to the 
demonstrations and riots raised new concerns among a much larger segment of the 
public” (Goldstein, 1990, p. 9). Consequently, public perceptions of the police during this 
time were especially poor among disadvantaged minorities (National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968). Further, crime and fear of crime were increasing 
and the police were unable to quell their growth (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Additionally, 
Martinson's (1974) proposition that "nothing works" altered the political and academic 
focus of criminology for many years. Rehabilitation efforts were deemed useless; 
sentencing and corrections policy were in a state of flux. 
Researchers were beginning to discover discrepancies between police practices 
and the police image; not due to corruption or poor management, but due to the 
impossible mandate and diverse, unmanageable public demands the police were faced 
with (see: Bittner, 1967; LaFave, 1965; Parnas, 1967; Reiss, 1971; Skolnick, 1966; 
Tiffany, McIntyre, & Rotenberg, 1967; Westley, 1970; Wilson, 1968). The professional 
model created social, and actual physical, distance between police and citizens. Car patrol 
was used instead of foot patrol, and, instead of talking to citizens, there was an over-
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reliance by the police on 911. Major policing principles were also being upended during 
this time. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, & 
Brown, 1974) found that preventive patrol did not deter crime, did not alter citizen 
satisfaction with police, and did not affect fear of crime.5 Further, the Kansas City Police 
Department (1977) found that rapid police patrol response time to calls for service had 
little impact on crime. Today, policing scholars are in general agreement that random 
preventive patrol does not impact crime (e.g., Bayley, 1994; Braga & Weisburd, 2010; 
Goldstein, 1979; Kelling et al., 1974; Klockars, 1985). Overall, the research on policing 
during this time, which questioned the value of standard police responses, concluded: 
“...most serious crimes were unaffected by the standard police actions designed to control 
them. Further, the public did not notice reductions in patrol, reduced speed responding to 
nonemergencies, or lack of follow-up investigations” (Eck & Spelman, 1987, p. 35). 
The mostly reactive nature of the police, while seemingly obvious to researchers 
in hindsight, was being called into question during this time (Goldstein, 1990; Reiss, 
1971). The changes called for by Vollmer, Wilson, and others were undoubtedly 
necessary in order to organize, train, and make the police more competent in general 
(Goldstein, 1979). The formulaic approach caused police progress to plateau, though, and 
internal competence became more important than the intended end product of policing 
(Goldstein, 1979). For example, the emphasis on response time over the actual handling 
of the problem by police demonstrated this “means over ends” syndrome (Goldstein, 
1979). Focusing on societal and community problems is the objective of policing, albeit 
                                                        
5 Although a widely influential study, the validity of its findings has been questioned due 
to methodological issues (Larson & Cahn, 1985; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd 
& Eck, 2004). 
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not obviously as citizens expect the police to enforce the law (Goldstein, 1979). In his 
seminal piece, Goldstein (1979) suggested “enforcing the criminal code is itself only a 
means to an end – one of several that the police employ in getting their job done. The 
emphasis on law enforcement, therefore, is nothing more than a continuing preoccupation 
with means” (p. 242). The strategies of the professional model were defensive in nature, 
and ill-suited for the unstable and changing social conditions inherent to the 1960s and 
1970s (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The crises that were occurring (crises that Goldstein 
(1990) believed stimulated progress) were bringing to light a need for a human element in 
police work (Goldstein, 1979). 
The Community Problem-Solving Era 
Foot patrol emerged as a popular policing strategy in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kelling & Moore, 1988), even being funded and implemented despite initial police 
opposition (Kelling, Pate, Ferrara, Utne, & Brown, 1981). Foot patrol renewed familiarity 
between the citizens and police (Kelling & Moore, 1988) – something that was seriously 
lacking in the professional era. Foot patrols are a common tactic employed in community 
oriented policing (Wakefield, 2007), and were adopted to improve citizen perceptions of 
the police and lessen fear of crime (Cordner, 1986; Jim, Mitchell, & Kent, 2006). In 
addition to being popular with citizens, research showed that foot patrols did indeed 
reduce fear of crime, improve reciprocal police-citizen perceptions (by increasing citizen 
satisfaction with police and improving police attitudes toward citizens), and increase 
morale and job satisfaction of police officers (Kelling et al., 1981; Trojanowicz, 1986). 
Research also showed at this time that when the police had information on crime that was 
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obtained by the public, (and properly managed), their impact on crime became significant 
(Eck, 1984; Pate, Bowers, & Parks, 1976). 
 Scholars suggested that the success of fear reduction via foot patrol was due in 
part to the order-maintenance component of the strategy (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Wilson 
& Kelling, 1982). Broken windows theory, developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982), 
posits that there is a causal relationship between crime and disorder; “disorder and crime 
are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence” (p. 31). The theory 
behind this was that signs of disorder might result in a breakdown of community controls 
(via fear), and that by maintaining order the police could bolster informal control 
mechanisms (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). This framework suggests that by focusing 
policing efforts on disorderly persons and places, crime and crime perceptions would 
decrease. The policy implications that result from this theory are centered on maintaining 
order, via a community-oriented approach (Harcourt, 2001). Early research supported this 
type of policing (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Sampson & Cohen, 1988; Skogan, 1990), but 
the relationship between crime and disorder has been questioned (Harcourt, 1998; 
Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). The broken windows paradigm persisted, and more 
generally came to be known as order-maintenance policing (Livingston, 1997). The 
strategies of this era increased police understanding of citizen concerns, and conversely 
gave citizens the confidence to talk to police and make them aware of community 
problems that departments were often lacking data on (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
Although there was a return to community and political authorization for the 
police during this time, the police professionalism that developed during the reform era 
continued to be influential, especially as a potential safeguard against rampant corruption 
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and brutality. The police function was much broader during this era, as well, and included 
order maintenance and problem solving, for example (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Whereas 
the professional era attempted to control crime via responsive actions, the community 
strategy emphasized prevention (Kelling & Moore, 1988). The nature of the new tactics 
employed by police made it so individual officers had more decision-making power, and 
were subsequently more invested in their jobs (Kelling & Moore, 1988). This 
decentralized organizational design allowed police executives and officers to work 
together on creating problem-specific solutions (Kelling & Moore, 1988); all police ranks 
now had information vital to bettering community issues. Quality of life and citizen 
satisfaction were considered viable outcomes of this era (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
Another key development in this era involved community participation in both 
defining and preventing crime (Goldstein, 1990; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Weisburd, 
McElroy, & Hardyman, 1988). It includes a wide array of approaches that combine both 
public and police resources (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Theoretically, community policing, 
broken windows policing, and order maintenance are all terms that overlap, mirroring 
similar concepts (Harcourt, 2001). Cordner (1999) suggests that the concepts of 
community policing can be grouped into four dimensions: philosophical, strategic, 
tactical, and organizational. The philosophical dimension focuses on the core beliefs of 
how the police should function, including understanding community values and assuming 
a service orientation (Cordner, 1999). The strategic dimension involves personal 
interaction with residents; this element’s goal is to increase trust and support between the 
police and the community (Cordner, 1999). The tactical dimension specifies that police 
show a vested interest in the area in which they work by understanding problems and 
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developing solutions (Goldstein, 1987). The organizational dimension requires alteration 
of the department hierarchy, shifting responsibility and encouraging creative, localized 
problem solving (Cordner, 1999). 
The Kelling and Moore historical construct has proved useful conceptually, but 
imprecise factually. For example, Williams and Murphy (1990) critique Kelling and 
Moore’s (1988) analysis of the changing role of police as “disturbingly incomplete” (p. 
27). They suggest that a minority perspective is lacking in the existing framework, and 
that slavery, segregation, discrimination, and racism have tangibly affected the evolution 
of the police function (Williams & Murphy, 1990). In addition to omitting race and 
ethnicity, the exclusion of gender, sexual orientation, citizenship status, and the 
intersection of these variables are also deficient in the model. The failure to examine 
social context, including economic, technological, and political advances, is also a 
notable limitation of the construct (Strecher, 1995). Walker’s (1984) critique centers on 
the interpretation of the impact of technological innovation on police-citizen contact, and 
on Kelling and Moore’s (1988) overstatement of crime control as a police function. 
Despite these limitations, Kelling and Moore have provided one rubric by which past, 
current, and future eras of policing can be classified, evaluated, and understood. The 
shortcomings of this framework, easily identified in retrospect, do not detract from the 
importance of this contribution to the understanding of the history of the police. 
1988-Present, and New Strategies in Policing 
The Kelling and Moore framework ends in 1988, and much has happened since 
then. In fact, we may be in a new era. Over the last 30 years, a number of policing 
strategies have emerged such as: problem-oriented, hot spots, offender-focused, zero-
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tolerance, evidence-based, and intelligence-led policing. All are important, but problem-
oriented policing remains one of the most popular and innovative strategies to emerge 
from this era. The next section provides a full discussion of problem-oriented policing. 
Problem-Oriented Policing 
In 1979, Herman Goldstein articulated a problem-oriented policing (POP) 
approach. This approach called for a more holistic view of crime problems; that is, crime 
is not isolated in its occurrence and should be evaluated as such. According to Eck 
(2006), 
...problem-oriented policing fundamentally redefines policing. It restates 
the police mission by creating a new unit of analysis for evaluating police 
actions: the ‘problem’. It shifts policing to a scientific approach to 
preventing crime and away from the routine application of the law. And it 
replaces the notion of the police as gatekeepers to the criminal justice 
system with the idea that police are central to many networks that affect 
public well-being. (p. 117) 
 
This approach reflected the tenets of the community problem-solving era. While 
community policing emphasizes police-community relations, POP attempts to understand 
the root causes of pervasive community issues and reduce their impact (Moore, 1992). 
POP aims to rectify the means over ends syndrome, by refocusing police efforts on 
addressing problems (Goldstein, 1979). Officers had been so focused on administrative 
competence that they had lost a problem-solving focus. Goldstein, however, felt that the 
impossible police mandate made problem-solving unattainable, and was careful to avoid 
this term (Scott, 2000); “reducing harm, alleviating suffering, and/or providing some 
measure of relief are ambitious enough aims for the police” (Braga, 2014, p. 109). Crime 
is often a reflection of a larger societal and legal climate (Bayley, 1994; Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990), but conventional thought suggests the police can temper the consequences 
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of these macro occurrences and impact crime rates. Although POP was intended to 
address a variety of police issues (e.g., budgetary/personnel issues, guide police 
discretion, and ground policing in applied social science; Eck, 2006; Goldstein, 1979, 
1990), it is generally discussed in the context of crime and disorder (Braga, 2014). 
Principles and Process of Problem-Oriented Policing 
The POP approach was made operational by researchers from the Police 
Executive Research Forum and officers from Newport News, Virginia (Eck & Spelman, 
1987). Eck and Spelman (1987) put forth the SARA strategy, built on three main POP 
themes: increased effectiveness and attention to underlying issues, expertise and 
creativity in developing innovative solutions, and police-community involvement to 
ensure citizen satisfaction. Essentially, POP and SARA are a response to the limitations 
of incident-driven policing (Eck & Spelman, 1987). The SARA model is as follows: 
scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (Eck & Spelman, 1987). Scanning involves 
identifying problems, or “a cluster of similar, related, or recurring incidents rather than a 
single incident; a substantive community concern; or a unit of police business” 
(Goldstein, 1990, p. 66). This identification is done via officer knowledge of community 
issues, consultation with community groups, or examining calls for service or incident 
reports (Braga, 2014). Related to the latter, inequitable distribution of crime at place (i.e., 
the study of “hot spots” of crime6) is identified in this way. Braga (2014) suggests that 
blending identification techniques is the most efficient approach. 
                                                        
6 The introduction of advanced technology in the 1980s brought with it capabilities for a 
more nuanced examination of crime concentration (Braga & Weisburd, 2010). The 
resulting research on hotspots of crime demonstrated a spatial clustering of various crime 
problems. For example, Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger (1989) found that 3% of all 
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The analysis phase instructs officers to gather all relevant information, from 
various sources, to understand and bring to light the underlying cause of the crime or 
community issue (Braga, 2014; Eck & Spelman, 1987). Atypical data sources that can be 
used in the analysis phase include victimization surveys, community crime audits, and 
offender interviews (Clarke, 1998). This phase is typically difficult for police to 
implement, often resulting in an inadequate depth of analysis producing approaches like 
directed patrol or a focus on repeat offenders (Braga, 2014; Goldstein, 1990). 
Comprehensive problem analysis often takes time and skills the police do not have. 
Ideally, based on the results of the analysis phase, an appropriate and creative response is 
then developed. Goldstein (1990) envisioned the POP response to be an innovative way 
of dealing with community issues. Responses can vary greatly because they must reflect 
“action suitable to the characteristics of the problem” (Eck & Spelman, 1987, p. 2). 
Responses should aim to reduce crime opportunities and/or increase informal social 
control, and can be done by working with the public, businesses, and community 
agencies (Braga, 2014; Eck & Spelman, 1987). Police should avoid over-reliance on law 
enforcement-only responses. Assessment of the response is the last step in the model. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
addresses accounted for 50% of all calls for service in Minneapolis. Characteristically 
high-crime neighborhoods also display this crime clustering, with most areas in troubled 
neighborhoods not exhibiting problematic crime statistics (see for e.g., Groff, Weisburd, 
& Morris, 2009; Sherman et al., 1989; Weisburd & Green, 1994). Hotspots policing is 
defined as “the application of police interventions at very small geographic units of 
analysis” (Braga & Weisburd, 2010, p. 9), and is strongly supported as a POP crime 
reduction technique (see for e.g., Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2012; Braga & Bond, 
2008; Sherman et al., 1989; National Research Council, 2004; Rosenfeld, Deckard, & 
Blackburn, 2014; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). In a recent systematic review of the 
available evidence, Braga et al. (2012) found that hot spots policing significantly reduced 
crime, disorder, and citizen calls for service.  
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The assessment phase is important because it is a way to maintain police 
accountability to the public, and it allows the police to understand the efficacy of their 
actions (Braga, 2014). This phase should occur in real-time and allow for course 
corrections in the response. The police are able to improve their efforts as a result (Braga, 
2014). The assessment of POP initiatives should describe the four phases, and measure 
“inputs, activities, outputs, and whatever can be said about the outcomes” of the 
implemented responses (Braga, 2014, p. 107). The assessment phase is also problematic 
for police, but that can be remedied by partnering with independent researchers (Braga, 
2014). Clarke (1998) suggests that if police undertake this phase alone, they should be 
rigorous and thorough in their development and presentation of the undertaken POP 
initiative to rule out alternate explanations, and they should be cognizant of crime 
displacement that may have occurred. 
The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing is a repository of many tools that 
researchers and practitioners can use to guide their problem-oriented strategies. The 
Center’s mission is to advance the concept and practice of problem-oriented policing by 
providing accessible information and networking tools (Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing, 2015). The website (popcenter.org) provides numerous problem specific guides, 
including: elderly abuse, home invasion, robbery, hate crimes, bullying, street 
prostitution, and so on. The website also provides core readings on POP and its 
implementation; for example, readings on situational crime prevention and its 
corresponding techniques. 
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Theoretical Perspectives 
POP has a strong theoretical foundation that can serve to guide its implementation 
in the field. A thorough review of these theoretical foundations is warranted. Developed 
by the British government’s criminological research department in the mid-1970s (Clarke 
& Mayhew, 1980; Mayhew et al., 1976), situational crime prevention has long been 
central to the POP movement (Clarke, 1997). Situational crime prevention advocates for 
a general approach to opportunity reduction, with techniques that are: 
(1) directed at highly specific forms of crime (2) that involve the 
management, design, or manipulation of the immediate environment in as 
systematic and permanent way as possible (3) so as to increase the effort 
and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as perceived by a wide range of 
offenders. (Clarke, 1997, p. 4) 
 
Research has long-established that individuals respond differently to stimuli (e.g., 
Thomas, 1927), and situational crime prevention uses this dynamic understanding to be 
applicable in a variety of situations (see Table 2). Situational analysis, therefore, can be 
considered “the search for regularities in relationships between behavior and situations” 
(Birkbeck & LaFree, 1993, p. 116). With POP and situational crime prevention based 
upon the idea that preventive measures (e.g., defensible space architecture, target-
hardening, and neighborhood watch) can reduce the opportunity for crime to occur 
(Clarke, 1983), opportunity theories of crime (i.e., routine activities and rational choice) 
naturally form their theoretical underpinnings (Braga, 2008; Clarke, 1997; Newman, 
Clarke, & Shoham, 1997; Reisig, 2010). 
 The routine activity perspective, originally formulated as a macro theory, states 
that structural changes in routine activity patterns influence crime rates by affecting the 
convergence in time and space of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence 
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of capable guardianship against a violation or crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Changes in 
routine activities in an area can alter the opportunity structure present, despite the 
proportion of offenders or targets in an area remaining stable. This notion is long 
supported, as individuals are known to traverse between antisocial and conforming 
behavior (Merton, 1938). Osgood and colleagues (1996) extended the routine activity 
framework to the individual level by examining how peer influence, absence of authority 
(guardianship) and the corresponding reduced social control, and unstructured time 
present opportunities for deviant behavior. Elements of POP, specifically the response 
phase of SARA, require officers to look beyond the convergence of time and space for 
crime (Goldstein, 1990). 
Routine activity theory and rational choice are often discussed in conjunction, as 
together they offer greater explanatory power and insight into the criminal event (Clarke 
& Felson, 1993). Offenders must choose if it is a rational decision to commit a crime 
when they happen upon a criminal opportunity, or situation. Specifically, rational choice 
theory focuses on the decision to initiate, continue, and desist from criminal behavior, 
thus yielding “potentially valuable insights for crime prevention” (Braga, 2014, p. 110). 
Crime events can be altered via crime prevention techniques if the situational elements of 
crime and routine activity patterns are considered (Groff, 2007). LaFree and Birkbeck 
(1991) define the term situation as “the perceptive field of the individual at a given point 
in time” (p. 75). Individuals may exercise restraining judgments (Athens, 1980), self-
control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), or varying levels of self-regulation (Mischel, 
1973) based on the perception of the situation (Stebbins, 1972). Table 2, for example, 
details techniques that can be used to reduce provocation. These techniques are designed  
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to reduce frustration, avoid disputes, and reduce emotional arousal (Cornish & Clarke, 
2003). Emphasis on the victim, as opposed to the offender, theoretically and 
methodologically limits situational theories of crime (Birkbeck & LaFree, 1993). If the 
definition of a situation remains constant, behavioral responses are predictable (Thomas, 
1927). If the situation changes, so too will situational reactions. This fundamental point 
of situational crime prevention gives the POP paradigm utility, because POP aims to use 
situation- and place-specific tactics to alter criminal behaviors and choices. 
Offender decisions are reconstructible; that is, they are predictable and not 
random (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1978; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993a; 
Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cusson, 1983; Walsh, 1978; Willmer, 1970). There are multiple 
decision points in a criminal event, beginning with the willingness and decision to 
commit an offense (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Arguably, everyone weighs the costs and 
benefits of their actions, oftentimes without full and accurate information (Cook, 1980). 
Further, not everyone weighs these costs and benefits the same (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). 
For example, some offenders are emboldened at the idea of being punished (Piquero & 
Pogarsky, 2002; Pogarsky & Piquero, 2003). Another example of this is how people use 
perceptual shorthand in their decision-making. That is, people do not consciously 
reevaluate their decisions and options in certain circumstances (Simon, 1957). This is 
particularly relevant when examining places, for example, as offenders may make 
judgments on crime opportunities, influencing the perpetuation of crime attraction and 
generation. Further, offender decision-making varies by crime type (see Topalli, 2005 for 
a general discussion), making situational crime prevention offense specific. Changing 
situations alters perceived effort, risk, and benefits, thereby altering choices and behavior 
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(Clarke, 1997). Understanding these situational contingencies, and enacting context 
specific preventive measures, increases the ability to effectively intervene and develop 
appropriate POP strategies (Clarke, 1995). For example, Table 2 details several 
techniques of situational crime prevention that can be used to increase perceived effort, 
including: target hardening (e.g., tamper proof packaging), controlling access to facilities 
(e.g., baggage screening), screening exits (e.g., electronic merchandise tags), and so on. 
Techniques to increase the risk of crime at place, also outlined in Table 2, include: 
assisting natural surveillance (e.g., improved street lighting), utilizing place managers 
(e.g., mandating two clerks per shift at convenience stores), and strengthening formal 
surveillance (e.g., employing security guards and installing alarms). 
Crime pattern theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984, 1991), a branch of 
situational crime prevention that incorporates elements of routine activity theory and 
rational choice theory, attempts to explain why individuals commit crimes in certain 
areas. Crime pattern theory aids in the analysis phase of SARA by providing a theoretical 
basis for the distribution of crime opportunities (Braga, 2014). By understanding the 
reproducible activities that individuals engage in, crime pattern theory provides POP with 
a basis for situation and place specific preventative measures. 
Crime pattern theory. Koffka (1935) suggested there exists a geographic 
environment, which is made of physical structures and relationships, and a behavioral 
environment, which is an individual’s perception of a geographic environment. Lewin 
(1936) furthered this idea by suggesting that individual behavior results from the 
interaction of personality with perceived environment. Gans (1972) proposed a potential 
and an effective environment, whereby the potential environment is the physical reality 
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that informs behavior via societal expectations and cultural norms. Around the same time, 
Sonnenfeld (1972) categorized the environment as having geographical, operational, 
perceptual, and behavioral elements. In this conceptualization, the geographical 
environment is the objective reality. The geographical environment impacts an 
individual’s behavior via the operational environment. The operational environment has a 
perceptual component, which is essentially what Brantingham and Brantingham (1984) 
would later term awareness space. Awareness is affected by direct and indirect 
experiences, among other things. The behavioral environment, a component of the 
perceptual environment, triggers action (Sonnenfeld, 1972; also see Porteous, 1977). 
In their seminal work on crime patterns, the Brantinghams (1984) defined the 
concept of environment as follows: 
For any individual the environment is the totality of objects – people, 
places and things – that he or she comes in contact with and the 
relationships that influence his or her behavior. The environment of a 
criminal act is the totality of objects and relationships that influence the 
commission of that criminal act. (p. 333) 
 
How environments are perceived affects spatial behavior. Although the cause and 
strength of criminal motivation varies, it is indisputable that there are people motivated to 
commit crimes (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). The existence of motivated 
offenders makes it possible to examine how exactly spatial decisions are related to 
environmental perception (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). This basic model of 
target selection is described by the following propositions, put forth by Brantingham & 
Brantingham (1978): 
I. Given the motivation of an individual to commit an offense, the actual 
commission of an offense is the end result of a multi-staged decision 
process which seeks out and identifies, within the general environment, a 
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target or victim positioned in time and space. II. The environment emits 
many signals, or cues, about its physical, spatial, cultural, legal and 
psychological characteristics. 
III. An individual motivated to commit a crime uses cues (either learned 
through experience or learned through social transmission) from the 
environment to locate and identify targets or victims. 
IV. As experiential knowledge grows, an individual motivated to commit 
an offense learns which individual cues are associated with “good” victims 
or targets. These cues, cue clusters, and cue sequences (spatial, physical, 
social, temporal, and so on) can be considered a template which is used in 
victim or target selection. Potential victims or targets are compared to the 
template and either rejected or accepted, depending on the consequence. 
V. Once the template is established, it becomes relatively fixed and 
influences future searching behavior, thereby becoming self-reinforcing. 
VI. Because of the multiplicity of targets and victims, many potential 
crime selection templates could be constructed. But because the spatial 
and temporal distribution of targets and victims is not regular, but 
clustered or patterned, and because human environmental perception has 
some universal properties, individual templates have similarities which 
can be identified. (pp. 107-108) 
 
Per proposition V, crime templates endure. That is, once a target, victim, or 
setting is identified as a suitable target (either via experience or social transmission) a 
criminal will feel comfortable in offending there, and that their behavior will not be 
interrupted (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). Additionally, different behavior occurs 
in different contexts (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1978, 1984). When a motivated 
offender perceives their behavior to be appropriate for a certain setting, and finds a target 
that matches their perceptual template, a decision is made to offend or not (Brantingham 
& Brantingham, 1978, 1984). Further, offenders disproportionately find suitable targets 
in certain settings (Block, Felson, & Block, 1985), often through overlapping activity 
spaces (Felson, 2006). Activity spaces are areas within which daily activities occur 
(Horton & Reynolds, 1971). Crime pattern theory posits that because offenders are 
influenced by their awareness and activity spaces, there exists an underlying structure to 
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crime patterns (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993b). Even when not totally predictable, 
behavior is patterned (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1984). This has obvious relevance to 
the police under a problem-oriented approach. 
Patterned behavior is often found in places that attract and generate crime, like 
convenience stores. Crime generators are places (business, facilities, institutions, etc.) 
that are easily accessible to large numbers of the public, and consequently are fertile 
grounds for opportunistic crime (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1995; Kinney, 
Brantingham, Wuschke, Kirk, & Brantingham, 2008; see also, McCord, Ratcliffe, Garcia, 
& Taylor, 2007). Crime attractors are places that are known to provide opportunities for 
deviance; they do not necessarily attract large numbers of people like crime generators, 
but contain attractive and weakly guarded targets (Bernasco & Block, 2011; Brantingham 
& Brantingham, 1995; Kinney et al., 2008). A store’s design, for example, can cause it to 
be labeled a crime attractor if the layout is deemed indefensible against crime (either via 
personal or socially transmitted experience). 
Crime prevention through environmental design. Crime prevention through 
environmental design (CPTED) attempts to influence offender decision-making, and is 
often employed at places that are known as crime attractors or generators. Jacobs (1961) 
suggested that there are three primary qualities that make city streets safer: a clear 
demarcation between public and private space, diversity of street use, and fairly constant 
sidewalk use. Jacobs (1961) posited that maintaining informal social control was 
necessary to deter crime, or what she termed “an almost unconscious network of 
voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the 
people themselves” (p. 31). Jacobs (1961) stated that although the police are necessary, 
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keeping the peace is not primarily their function. Jacobs’ model of land use and 
commercial space may have proven to be inapplicable in many places (Angel, 1968; 
Reppetto, 1976b), but Angel (1968) suggested that, by designing environments such that 
evening establishments are centralized and easily monitored, the opportunities for crime 
would decrease. More specifically, a “critical high-crime intensity zone” was 
hypothesized; pedestrian circulation needs to be balanced so that it does not attract the 
attention of offenders, and still provides sufficient surveillance. It was later found that 
Angel’s model did not significantly reduce crime (Wilcox, 1974). Additionally, Jeffery’s 
(1971) Crime Prevention through Environmental Design posited that crime risk may be 
reduced through modifications to the business environment, and that the sociological 
focus on the social causes of crime were greatly exaggerated. Jeffery greatly contributing 
to the theoretical development of CPTED, and is generally credited with coining the 
term. His work was (and is) oft-neglected by criminologists (Robinson, 1999), due to its 
emphasis on biological and environmental determinants (which have historically gone 
through phases of acceptance among the criminological community). Discussions of POP 
acknowledge Jeffery’s contributions, but CPTED has since moved in a different 
direction. Why people offend, as Eck (2000) suggests, is not especially relevant to the 
police; opportunities and decision-making surrounding places, targets, and times has 
much more utility for the implementation of POP interventions (Braga, 2014; Eck, 2000; 
Felson & Clarke, 1998). 
The notion that certain design features can affect the probability of crime is borne 
from architect Oscar Newman’s theory of defensible space (1972); this is a key 
component of CPTED developed almost concurrently with Jeffery’s work. Building on 
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previous work, Newman suggested that defensible space, or space manipulated to alter 
behavior and increase security, would increase mutual responsibility and surveillance, as 
well as increase perceptions of risk of apprehension to motivated offenders. Today, 
CPTED is understood to be the “proper design and effective use of the built 
environment” which “can lead to a reduction in the fear and incidence of crime, and an 
improvement in the quality of life” (Crowe, 2000, p. 46). Brantingham and Faust (1976) 
developed a conceptual model of crime prevention, with three levels: 
(1) primary prevention, directed at modification of criminogenic 
conditions in the physical and social environment at large; (2) secondary 
prevention, directed at early identification and intervention in the lives of 
individuals or groups in criminogenic circumstances; and (3) tertiary 
prevention, directed at prevention of recidivism. (p. 284) 
 
Primary crime prevention specifically identifies risky aspects of an environment 
that provide opportunities for and even precipitate criminal behavior, with the goal of 
stopping crime before it occurs. Secondary prevention identifies risky individuals or 
groups, with the intent to prevent risk from materializing further. Tertiary crime 
prevention is aimed at reducing recidivism via controlling routine activities rather than 
therapeutic intervention (Brantingham & Faust, 1976).  
Wortley (1997, 1998) has suggested that opportunity reduction and an 
understanding of the precipitators of behavior are necessary to fully grasp situational 
crime prevention. These are also basic tenets of POP, as conceptualized by Goldstein 
(1979; 1990). According to Wortley (2001), there are several ways situations precipitate 
criminal responses: 
Situations can present cues that prompt an individual to perform criminal 
behavior; they can exert social pressure on an individual to offend; they 
can weaken moral prohibitions and so permit potential offenders to 
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commit illegal acts; and they can produce emotional arousal that provokes 
a criminal response. (pp. 6-7) 
 
In turn, Wortley put forth the strategies of controlling prompts, controlling pressures, 
reducing permissibility, and reducing provocations – each with four corresponding 
techniques (2001, p. 7). Situational conditions may present subtle cues that elicit criminal 
behavior (Wortley, 2001). To control prompts, Wortley (2001) suggest controlling 
triggers (e.g., prohibiting sex offenders from working with children), providing reminders 
(of appropriate and lawful behavior), reducing inappropriate imitation (e.g., broken 
windows theory premise), and setting positive expectations (i.e., alter offender 
expectations). The four prevention techniques associated with controlling pressures are 
reducing inappropriate conformity, reducing inappropriate obedience, encouraging 
compliance, and reducing anonymity (Wortley, 2001). These techniques revolve around 
complying with requests, obeying instructions, conforming to group norms, and so on. 
Reducing permissibility refers to the idea that situational factors may contribute to 
decision-making processes; that is, some environmental contexts facilitate criminal 
involvement (Wortley, 2001), thereby distorting morality and giving way to excuses of 
behavior (see: Sykes & Matza, 1957). To reduce permissibility, rule setting (i.e., reducing 
rule ambiguity), clarifying responsibility (e.g., controlling alcohol intake), clarifying 
consequences (by explaining the cumulative impact of seemingly minor offenses), and 
personalizing victims are suggested. Situational stress, or provocation, may lead to 
antisocial responses (Wortley, 2001; for a discussion of strain, personality, and 
delinquency see: Agnew, Brezina, Wright, & Cullen, 2002) To reduce provocation, 
Wortley (2001) suggests reducing frustration (for e.g., stress can be reduced for drivers 
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via more efficient traffic flow), reducing spatial crowding (i.e., reduced social density), 
respecting territory (i.e., identifying and regulating territorial possession), and controlling 
environmental irritants (i.e., stress results from intense heat, noise, etc.). More recently, 
Cornish and Clarke (2003) responded to Wortley (2001), adding more techniques to their 
framework (see Table 2). 
All of this has importance for the police because they can work with place 
managers to alter the crime-prone environment. As a result, police often receive CPTED 
training (Cozens, Thorn, & Hillier, 2008; Kelpczarek, 2003; McDonald & Kitteringham, 
2004). Their role cannot be understated – the police have current, firsthand knowledge of 
criminal behavior (both micro and macro), as well as an understanding of the crime-prone 
locations (Potts, 1989). If a space is consistently a factor in the commission of crimes, the 
police are in the best position to understand why that is so. Specifically, police 
involvement in CPTED can be realized as: 
Development of crime prevention strategies based on environmental 
principles; development of profile data of the target areas; development of 
victim oriented approaches which are based on maximising security but 
relate to both the physical and social environment; and identification of 
new criminal techniques and activity and use of CPTED and other 
measures to combat them. (Potts, 1989, p. 74) 
 
Crime displacement and diffusion. According to the rational choice perspective 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1987), offenders weigh the difficulty and riskiness of a situation 
before taking action. Situational crime prevention posits that by manipulating the 
perceived risks and/or rewards of an opportunity, the likelihood of crime can be reduced 
(Clarke, 1983). As opportunity theories of crime and prevention assume offender 
motivation to be stable, it can be plausibly deduced that a motivated offender will not be 
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deterred by a blocked opportunity, but will instead target something or somewhere else 
(Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2014). Thomas Reppetto (1976a) articulated this 
phenomenon in his seminal article, providing a foundational hypothesis for future 
empirical assessments. This phenomenon is termed displacement, and critics of 
situational crime prevention and CPTED often mention it as a limitation to these 
approaches.7 
By blocking or preventing crime in one area, crime may simply move in location 
or time (spatial and temporal displacement) or transform into a different crime type 
(crime type or offense displacement) (Gabor, 1981; Reppetto, 1976a). Other 
opportunities may also be found via different targets (target displacement), or through the 
use of different methods (tactical displacement) (Hakim & Rengert, 1981; Hesseling, 
1994). Barr and Pease (1990) suggest a sixth type of displacement exists: perpetrator 
displacement. Using the example of drug trafficking, the authors state that some crime 
opportunities are so compelling that they will continually be repeated by whichever 
offender is available for the task (Barr & Pease, 1990, p. 279). In Guerette and Bowers’ 
(2009) review of displacement in situational crime prevention evaluations, the authors 
found that spatial displacement and diffusion were the most commonly examined (47%), 
followed by offense (24%), target (14%), tactical (9%), and perpetrator displacement 
                                                        
7 Few studies have found evidence of displacement (e.g., Gabor, 1981; Holt, Blevins, & 
Kuhns, 2008; Lateef, 1974; Tyrpak, 1975). A study by Taylor, Koper, and Woods (2011) 
examining displacement did find, however, that POP buffer zones experienced increases 
in violence and calls for service. The authors do not regard this as evidence of 
displacement, though; they suggest that the POP intervention caused more community 
engagement with policing efforts, and that the likelihood of reporting crime increased 
during this time. 
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(<1%). Eck (1993) also found spatial displacement to be the most recognizable and 
studied form of displacement. 
Proponents of the existence of displacement purport the following: 
...[A]ny pattern of crime can be thought of as the distribution of people 
and places from which crime has not been displaced. The observed pattern 
is a temporary product of a particular set of physical and social 
arrangements. Crime patterns at any time are frozen displacement patterns. 
Displacement is but another placement. (Barr & Pease, 1990, p. 281) 
 
Displacement often assumes that offenders are not specialized, but rather generalist in 
their offending; and that criminal inclination is constant (Cornish & Clarke, 1986b). This 
notion has recently been (partially) debunked, with Sullivan, McGloin, Pratt, and Piquero 
(2006)8 finding more evidence of specialization than versatility in offending. Many 
theories of criminality also assume displacement to be inevitable (e.g., Yochelson & 
Samenow, 1976). Studies have found, however, that when offenders are prevented from 
committing a crime, the majority do not seek out alternative opportunities (e.g., Bennett 
& Wright, 1984). Additionally, Eck (1993) developed the familiarity decay hypothesis: 
offenders’ likelihood of targeting a crime opportunity is inversely related to the distance 
from their routine activity space (Cohen & Felson, 1979). In other words, an offender’s 
mental map of his/her environment (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981) extends only so 
far, and criminal behavior is not random; if an offender does not have the advantage of a 
known location he/she will be less likely to offend (Eck, 1993). In other words, 
desistance from crime is more likely than displacement (Johnson et al., 2014). This decay 
is also applicable temporally, with recent awareness spaces losing their familiarity as 
                                                        
8 According to Sullivan et al. (2006), “short-term offense specialization is not a 
methodological artifact but rather a reflection of an enduring empirical reality” (p. 222). 
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time progresses (Bernasco, 2010). CPTED and situational crime prevention seek to 
disrupt the intersection of awareness space and suitable target in a certain location, with 
longer interventions theoretically able to reduce sentimentality or familiarity with a 
preferred offending location. 
Several studies have found that problem-oriented policing approaches do not 
cause crime displacement (e.g., Braga et al., 1999; Gabor, 19909; Rosenfeld et al., 2014; 
Weisburd et al., 2006).10 Spatial displacement has been found to be relatively rare for 
place-based interventions at large-scale geographic areas (Telep, Weisburd, Gill, Vitter, 
& Teichman, 2014). Additionally, a meta-analysis examining smaller geographic areas, 
including hotspots, found that geographically focused policing initiatives have an overall 
reductive impact on crime outcomes, and that a diffusion of benefits is a more likely 
outcome than displacement (Bowers, Johnson, Guerette, Summers, & Poynton, 2011). 
Diffusion of benefit is essentially the displacement of positive effects received from an 
intervention onto an area that did not receive an intervention (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994), 
and it has been documented in several crime prevention studies (e.g., Bowers & Johnson, 
2003; Chaiken, Lawless, & Stevenson, 1974; Green, 1995; Miethe, 1991; Weisburd et al., 
2006; Weisburd & Green, 1995a). Further, there is the potential for communities to 
benefit from offenders being displaced from more to less violent crime (Barr & Pease, 
1990). Of the seven major reviews of empirical studies examining displacement since 
                                                        
9 Gabor (1990) stated that the evidence supporting displacement is ambiguous, and that 
usually only a partial displacement effect is identified. In other words, “the volume of 
displaced crime does not equal that deterred or prevented” (p. 66). 
10 Barr and Pease (1990) have put forth the concepts of benign and malign displacement. 
The authors also examine “how displacement could be used purposefully to create an 
optimal distribution of crime” (p. 278). 
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1990, all have concluded that there is little evidence that place-based prevention 
strategies result in displacement (Barr & Pease, 1990; Bowers et al., 2011; Eck, 1993; 
Guerette & Bowers, 2009; Hesseling, 1994; Johnson, Guerette, & Bowers, 2012; Telep et 
al., 2014). 
Weighted displacement quotient. Prior to 2003, displacement was discussed 
primarily in a theoretical context. Standardized techniques related to quantifying 
displacement were absent. Advocates of the situational approach have long-noted these 
issues (e.g., Barnes, 1995), in addition to contending with persistent and substantial 
criticisms of displacement. Previous approaches to the measurement of displacement 
have advanced the field significantly (e.g., Braga et al., 1999; Weisburd & Green, 1995a), 
but have highlighted several problems in the approaches taken. Bowers and Johnson 
(2003) outline these issues in their seminal piece on the standardization of measurement 
for displacement and diffusion. The authors draw attention to the problem of attributing 
changes in the displacement zones to treatment that has taken place in the intervention 
area. Weisburd and Green (1995b) believe that looking for evidence of displacement 
around the intervention area is nonsensical if the intervention tested has not reduced 
offending. Measuring “phantom displacement” can result from using previous 
displacement measurement tactics (Bowers & Johnson, 2003, p. 277). 
An additional problem arises when defining the catchment area, or the area crime 
is most likely to be displaced. These areas are also termed “buffer zones,” and defining 
an appropriate size for these areas in often contentious. In the first account of using these 
zones, Allatt (1984) examined “a small area of private housing to the west of the target 
estate and, to the north, across a thoroughfare, a council estate” (p. 102). There is no 
  42 
standardized selection process for defining a buffer zone. Boba (2005) defines a buffer as 
“a specified area around a feature on a map” (p. 43). Many GIS scientists examine 
displacement using polygon shapes around an object (convenience store, restaurant, etc.) 
that are created to be uniform in size (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011). Ratcliffe and Breen 
(2011) detail the nuance that should be used to ascertain if a catchment area is 
appropriate. 
The assumption of isotropic geographical space (Tobler, 1993) might be 
incorrect when placed in the context of predicting likely displacement or 
diffusion of benefits resulting from crime prevention activity. There are no 
firm rules for selection of buffer areas, but… [Ratcliffe and Breen] were 
able to combine local knowledge regarding offender behavior to determine 
context-specific buffer areas. (p. 235) 
 
Weisburd and Green (1995b) also note that displacement assessments are often after-
thoughts. That is, most studies are designed to test an intervention’s effects and therefore 
lack a powerful research design for examining displacement and, relatedly, diffusion. The 
authors believe that studies need to be specifically designed to identify these phenomena 
in order for the field of criminology to produce rigorous, progressive research. John 
Eck’s (1993) concept of familiarity decay is critical to this discussion. Eck posits that 
offenders are more likely to target familiar places than unfamiliar areas. Relatedly, 
environmental criminology supports this assertion by examining offenders’ target 
selections in relation to their routine activities (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). In 
the extant literature, buffer zones vary in size, although many scholars choose an 
approximate two-block radius. This catchment size is reasonably close enough to detect 
any reliable displacement effects, and far enough from the target that any existing spatial 
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displacement will not be diluted (see: Telep, Mitchell, & Weisburd, 2014; Weisburd & 
Green, 1995b; Weisburd et al., 2006). 
Bowers and Johnson (2003) devised the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ) 
to standardize the measurement of the geographical displacement of crime, which is 
applicable to any geographical boundary. Bowers and Johnson (2003) provide insight 
into using the WDQ as follows: 
1.) Over any given time period, buffer zone (B) will account for a 
particular proportion of the crime committed within a control area (C); 
2.) If geographic displacement does occur it should displace from the 
intervention area (A) into the buffer zone (B) that surrounds it; and  
3.) If displacement does occur then, relative to the control area (C), crime 
in the buffer zone (B) should increase while crime in the action area (A) 
should decrease. 
 
Because the WDQ examines changes in crime rates and not volume, the data are 
standardized and able to be compared across studies11 (Bowers & Johnson, 2003, p. 287). 
Building on Bowers and Johnson’s (2003) work, Ratcliffe and Breen (2011) 
sought to strengthen the utility of the WDQ by introducing a measure of statistical 
significance to be used in conjunction. Prior to employing the WDQ, Ratcliffe and Breen 
(2011) suggest calculating phi. Phi has two main purposes in relation to the WDQ: to 
determine the statistical significance of the data prior to calculating the WDQ, and to 
confirm that the target area and buffer zone operate independently. The phi statistic 
assesses the existence of a statistically significant difference between crime in the buffer 
area and the target area, signaling that displacement is not a “foregone conclusion” in 
place-based interventions (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2003, p. 237). 
                                                        
11 Jerry Ratcliffe has developed a WDQ spreadsheet calculator, which is accessible via 
his personal website: http://www.jratcliffe.net/software/wdq-spreadsheet-calculator/ 
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Evaluation of Problem-Oriented Approaches 
An early review by Sherman (1991) suggested there was a lack of rigorous 
evidence to support Goldstein’s (1990) assertion that POP was a superior strategy to 
traditional policing. Today there is general agreement that POP is effective and practical 
at reducing crime and disorder, which is evident by its widespread, worldwide 
implementation (Braga, 2014). The popularity of POP is not enough to conclude it is 
effective, though, and the extant literature is lacking in rigorous study design and 
assessment of this police strategy. Weisburd, Eck, Hinkle, and Telep (2008) conducted a 
systematic review examining the effect of POP on crime and disorder. Surprisingly, 
despite POP being popular and implemented often, only ten studies met their rigorous 
methodological criteria for inclusion. The authors found a modest but significant impact 
of POP techniques on the reduction of crime and disorder. Weisburd and colleagues 
(2010) extended their systematic review to also include less rigorous study designs 
(quadrupling their sample size). Their findings again found strong evidence to support 
POP’s effectiveness at reducing crime and disorder. Additionally, White, Fyfe, Campbell, 
and Goldkamp (2003) found that POP can reduce crime, but posit that this finding is 
likely dependent upon effective leadership and reliable implementation. In fact, 
leadership plays a key role in ideal applications of POP. Goldstein (1979, 1990) 
originally suggested that POP efforts be located within police headquarters; as 
decentralized approaches may actually reduce the quality of POP interventions, because 
officers are ill-equipped to work through the SARA model without assistance (Eck, 
2006). 
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In 1987, the National Institute of Justice selected the Newport News Police 
Department to serve as the pilot test site of problem-oriented policing (Eck et al., 1987). 
John Eck and William Spelman assisted in conducting the first application of POP, in 
consultation with Herman Goldstein. The police department, in conjunction with the 
research partners, developed a four-stage problem-solving process: scanning, analysis, 
response, and assessment (SARA). An evaluation of the project revealed reduced 
burglaries at a problematic apartment complex, a reduction in robberies in the city’s 
business district, and a reduction in thefts from vehicles (Eck et al., 1987). The 
effectiveness of the project was encouraging, and emboldened other police departments 
to implement problem-oriented policing initiatives. Two more recent applications of POP 
that are oft-cited are the Boston Police Department’s Operation Ceasefire intervention to 
prevent gang violence (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001), and the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department’s program to reduce theft from construction sites 
(Clarke & Goldstein, 2002). Braga and colleagues (2001) found that Operation Ceasefire, 
a pulling levers approach focused on chronic offenders, was associated with significant 
reductions in homicide victimization, certain types of calls for service, and gun assaults. 
Clarke and Goldstein (2002) also reported positive results. After identifying construction 
site theft of appliances in Charlotte, North Carolina as a problem, a cost-effective 
response was developed: delay installation of home appliances until homeowners take 
residence. Although builder compliance varied, the analysis revealed declines in 
appliance theft with no resulting displacement of theft to surrounding areas. 
Theoretically, POP has a sound basis, and research has shown that POP is effective at 
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reducing crime and disorder. The translation from theory to practice is often an issue in 
much of criminology, though. 
POP is considered by some to be the apex of modern police strategies, and is 
“widely regarded as the most analytical and intellectually challenging strategy in the 
police arsenal” (Cordner & Biebel, 2005, p. 155). That said, the implementation of POP 
often suffers as a result of its demanding nature, and falls short of the model envisioned 
by Goldstein. Because POP is often not implemented as intended and with fidelity, more 
research is needed to conclude its effectiveness. Generally, the police are adept at the 
scanning phase and identifying problems (Bynum, 2001), but often unintentionally 
undermine the intended POP initiative by focusing on problems either too big or too 
small. This then hinders the POP project by placing successful implementation out of 
reach. The analysis phase, which aims to understand the nature of a problem’s existence, 
also often falls short. In practice, the analysis phase of POP is often “cursory or 
nonexistent” (Cordner & Biebel, 2005, p. 159), and shallow (Braga & Weisburd, 2010). 
Even the most exemplary POP projects have difficulty ascertaining why an issue is 
occurring, and instead just settle for identifying its existence (Scott, 2000) – a problem 
endemic to various academic endeavors, though. Research has consistently found that 
officers have difficulty understanding the nature of the problems they are addressing 
(Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Tilley, 1999; Webster & Connors, 1993). For example, in an 
examination of POP projects in forty-three police departments, Read and Tilley (2000) 
found analysis to be generally weak, with departments shallowly defining problems using 
short-term data. 
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There are noted problems with the response phase of SARA as well. There is 
often excessive dependence on traditional crime-control strategies. Responses are 
typically characterized by a lack of innovativeness, collaboration, and engagement with 
other stakeholders. In 2005, Goldstein lamented the overreliance on enforcement in POP 
responses (Cordner & Biebel, 2005). Clarke (1998), discussing subpar POP projects 
nominated for the Herman Goldstein award12, stated that (aside from CPTED 
implementation) there was a dearth of unconventional and creative responses in POP. 
Assessment is also a difficult phase for officers to thoroughly conduct. Tilley (1999) 
found that police rarely “assess their own problem-oriented initiatives as anything other 
than successes” (p. 273). Assessment is rarely conducted in a comprehensive manner, and 
is usually imprecise or anecdotal (Capowich & Roehl, 1994; Scott, 2000; Scott & Clarke, 
2000). Cordner & Biebel (2005) attribute this to police officers being “more prone to 
action than to research” (p. 159). There are problem-oriented interventions that do follow 
the SARA model as originally envisioned. The New Haven SPI, for example, followed 
the SARA paradigm and found large reductions (up to 56%) in crime in high-risk areas 
(Sedelmaier, 2015). The initiative did find, though, that upper command support for the 
problem-oriented strategy was inconsistent; most likely because shifts in organizational 
culture take significant time (Sedelmaier, 2015). Overall, POP interventions tend to fall 
short of the ideal model put forth by Goldstein (e.g., Cordner & Biebel, 2005), and 
instead reflect a more shallow and simple problem-solving effort (Braga & Weisburd, 
                                                        
12 This award, first introduced in 1993 and named for the founder of problem-oriented 
policing, recognizes innovative and effective problem-solving police efforts worldwide 
(Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2015). The quality of the submissions vary 
greatly, and the number of submissions averages approximately 50-70 per year. Of these 
submissions, 5-10 are selected as finalists. 
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2006). In sum, POP is often not implemented as intended; is rarely evaluated rigorously; 
and as a result, its potential for crime control is not clear. The current study will examine 
a POP project in Glendale, AZ that avoided these common implementation and 
evaluation pitfalls, using a rigorous research design that reaches Level 4 on the Maryland 
Scientific Scale13 (Sherman et al., 1998). 
Smart Policing Initiative 
 The Great Recession of the late 2000s affected many aspects of the criminal 
justice system, but the sharp economic decline had a noticeable impact on policing 
practices. Budget reductions affected police hiring, equipment purchases, and patrol 
tactics (Coldren, Huntoon, & Medaris, 2013). After all of the innovation that had been 
achieved in policing over the last several decades, many police departments were forced 
to revert back to mainly responding to calls for service (Coldren et al., 2013). Notably, 
many of the major innovations in policing were born from local police departments and 
universities (Coldren et al., 2013). For example, POP originated during Herman 
Goldstein’s time at the University of Wisconsin, and the beginnings of community 
policing came from Robert Trojanowicz’s time at Michigan State University (Coldren et 
al., 2013). These local solutions tended to be more cost effective than traditional 
strategies. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) took note of these local innovations 
and their corresponding crime reduction, and in 2009, spurred by the downtrodden 
                                                        
13 The Maryland Scale of Scientific Methods ranks studies from weakest (1) to strongest 
(5) on overall internal validity (Sherman et al., 1998). For example, a Level 1 study 
examines correlation between prevention programs and crime at a single time point. A 
Level 4 study will compare multiple units, control for other factors, or use comparison 
units. A Level 5 study employs random assignment and analysis of intervention and 
control groups. 
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economy, released the first Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) solicitation (Coldren et al., 
2013). 
The Smart Policing Initiative is a collaborative effort to test solutions to serious 
crime problems in specific jurisdictions. According to BJA’s Smart Policing website 
(2010), “effective policing requires a tightly focused, collaborative approach that is 
measurable; based on sound, detailed analysis; and includes policies and procedures that 
promote and support accountability.” There are five key principles of Smart Policing, 
including: (1) performance measurement and research partnerships, (2) outreach and 
collaboration, (3) managing organizational change, (4) strategic targeting, and (5) making 
better use of intelligence and other data and information systems (“Smart Policing,” 
2010). According to Coldren et al. (2013), Smart Policing demonstrates the following 
characteristics: (1) locally driven, with no required approach to crime control; (2) a focus 
on science and rigorous evaluation, with a particular emphasis on experimental and 
quasi-experimental designs; (3) a multifaceted approach to problem-solving, derived 
from analysis; (4) results that clearly indicate effectiveness of the initiative; and (5) 
innovative approaches that test new and existing crime control and prevention strategies 
(p. 278). The tenets of Smart Policing essentially further and strengthen the evidence-
based policing movement, whereby “…police practices should be based on scientific 
evidence about what works best” (Sherman, 1998, p. 2). Several professional 
organizations have been developed to increase awareness of and advocate for evidence-
based practices (see: Society of Evidence-Based Policing, Australian-New Zealand 
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Society of Evidence-Based Policing, Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy).14 Police 
departments and researchers are conflicted over the implementation of these practices; 
recent and strong demands for police change call for a totally-evidenced approach to be 
explored, but traditionally this movement has evolved incrementally (Sherman, 2015). 
 Local SPI projects have addressed a gamut of problems, including homicide, 
domestic violence, property crime, repeat offending, and many others (Coldren et al., 
2013). The strategies employed and implemented by the SPI teams vary, as well. These 
tactics can be place- or offender-based, geared toward a problem- or community-oriented 
approach, use predictive-analytic or intelligence-led policing, or a combination of these, 
for example (Coldren et al., 2013). “SPI does not prescribe any model or approach; 
rather, it stresses the importance of in-depth problem analysis and definition (with, 
presumably, the help of a research partner) to support the selection and combination of 
various approaches in SPI sites” (Coldren et al., 2013, p. 282). Funding from BJA, 
however, is partly contingent upon research and analysis focusing on the SARA model 
(“Smart Policing,” 2010). 
 Research partnerships are a fundamental component of SPI. Initially intended to 
capitalize on the “local genius” (Coldren et al., 2013, p. 277) of nearby universities and 
police departments, the need for police-research partnerships became more apparent after 
research by Weisburd and colleagues (2010) was published examining the effects of 
POP. This systematic review identified 5,500 articles addressing the effectiveness of 
                                                        
14 These organizations can be found online at: www.debp.police.uk, www.anzsebp.com/, 
and cebcp.org.  
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POP, but only ten15 of these studies had rigorous research designs that would allow them 
to be included in the review. Although the results of these studies were positive, BJA 
started emphasizing and strengthening research partner requirements. An assessment of 
several of the local SPI police-researcher partnerships revealed that both police and 
researchers rated the partnerships positively (Martin-Roethele, 2013; White, 2012). These 
relationships are “productive and mutually beneficial” and “researchers have more impact 
than they give themselves credit for” (Coldren et al., 2013, p. 280). Since SPI’s inception, 
police and researchers have successfully worked together to design evidence-based 
strategies effective in micro-places (Joyce, Ramsey, & Stewart, 2013). 
 Although POP and hot spots policing have developed on two separate, parallel 
tracks, they do overlap occasionally. Most hot spots initiatives give little direction in 
terms of what to do at these micro-places, but the natural symmetry between POP and hot 
spots joins them together in a way that provides cohesion and direction. There are several 
Smart Policing examples of these types of place-based interventions, including the 
Philadelphia SPI, the Boston SPI, and the Glendale SPI. In an effort to determine the 
impact of differential policing strategies employed at violent crime hotspots, the 
Philadelphia Police Department and its research partners at Temple University 
implemented a randomized controlled design to test foot patrol, problem-oriented 
policing, and offender-focused policing. An examination of Philadelphia’s crime incident 
database identified 81 mutually exclusive hotspots (Ratcliffe, Groff, Haberman, Sorg, & 
                                                        
15 The included studies were: Baker & Wolfer (2003); Braga et al. (1999); Knoxville 
Police Department (2002); Mazerolle, Price, & Roehl (2000); Sherman et al. (1989); 
Stokes, Donahue, Caron, & Greene, (1996); Stone (1993); Thomas (1998); Tuffin, 
Morris, & Poole (2006); Weisburd & Green (1995a). 
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Joyce, 2013). 20 hotspots received foot patrol, 20 received problem-oriented policing, 
and 20 received an offender-focused initiative; all with 7 control hotspots, respectively. 
Despite following the SARA paradigm, the SPI team only found a significant reduction 
in crime in the areas implementing offender-focused strategies (a 31% decrease in violent 
street felonies). The researchers do not disregard the potential of POP, though. Ratcliffe 
and colleagues (2013) simply suggest that complex strategies, like POP, may work but 
not in the short-term. That is, other strategies may generate crime reduction quicker than 
problem-oriented policing. Problem-oriented initiatives try to understand the deep-seated 
social and environmental causes of crime, thereby naturally taking longer for change to 
take hold.  
 The Boston SPI was also a place-based, POP intervention. From 2004 to 2006 
Boston experienced notable increases in violent crime, concentrated in disadvantaged 
areas (Braga, Davis, & White, 2012). In 2006, the new Commissioner of the Boston 
Police Department (BPD), Edward Davis, set about addressing this problem. The Safe 
Street Team strategy was developed, assigning teams of officers to 13 different violent 
crime hotspots to apply problem-oriented, community-policing strategies. The BJA’s SPI 
funded the BPD to conduct an ex-post facto evaluation of the strategy. Partnering with 
researchers from Rutgers University, a longitudinal analysis of the stability of hotspots 
was conducted using a nonrandomized quasi-experimental design. Although the location 
of violent crime hotspots proved to be stable over time, the deployment of nearly 400 
different situational/environmental, enforcement, and social service interventions in the 
hotspots resulted in a 17.3% reduction in the total number of violent crimes (Braga e t al., 
2012). The Boston SPI showed that retrospective, rigorous evaluation can be conducted 
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effectively and with value to other police departments. Similarly, the Glendale SPI also 
provides an example of the marriage between POP, hotspots, smart policing, and ex-post 
facto evaluation. 
Current Focus 
In 2009, after receiving funding from the BJA’s SPI, the Glendale, AZ Police 
Department sought to address crime at convenience stores through a problem-oriented 
policing approach. The Glendale SPI provides a roadmap for implementing POP, 
especially during the most difficult phases of analysis and assessment. With the SPI 
providing the ingredients to avoid the common pitfalls of POP, along with the guidance 
of the research partners, rigorous analysis and robust evaluation can result. Arizona State 
University trained Glendale Police Department personnel from two squads on POP, using 
the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing model curriculum.16 The seven training 
sessions, which exceeded twenty hours of classroom-based instruction delivered over a 
period of several months, were conducted to enhance officers’ knowledge of in-depth 
POP. The curriculum included a historical overview (including Goldstein’s vision, and 
the evolution of COP/POP), theoretical foundations (situational crime prevention, routine 
activities, and broken windows), and the SARA model (lectures, and group assignments). 
During the training sessions, the officers carried out the scanning and analyses phases of 
SARA, and devised detailed, comprehensive response and assessment plans. The training 
also included POP knowledge assessments (tests), which were given pre- and post-
training on December 1st, 2009 and April 28th, 2010, respectively. During this five-month 
                                                        
16 See http://www.popcenter.org/learning/model_curriculum/. 
  54 
lag between tests, officer knowledge improved significantly. The average score increased 
from 68.5% to 80.5%.17 
Convenience stores were chosen during the scanning phase because officers 
identified these locations as crime hot spots that threatened both citizen safety and officer 
resources (White & Katz, 2013). During the analysis phase all calls for service at 
convenience stores were examined. It was then discovered that calls for service were 
disproportionately occurring at Circle K stores. In Glendale, Arizona there are 65 
convenience stores, 15 of which are Circle Ks.18 In 2010, these 15 stores (23% of all 
stores) represented 79% of the calls for service at convenience stores (White & Katz, 
2013). Several of the Circle K stores averaged more than 500 calls for service per year. 
The analysis also explored the causes of the disproportionality through geographic 
analysis, interviews of key stakeholders, and CPTED evaluations of Circle Ks and other 
convenience stores. White and Balkcom (2012) demonstrated the economic impact of 
Circle K calls for service by estimating that the top six most active stores generated more 
than $15.2 million in total crime victimization costs in 2010 alone. 
The majority of crimes being committed at these stores involved thefts of 
merchandise, thefts of gas, fights, disorderly conduct, panhandling, and robberies. The 
most frequently committed crime involved the theft of large quantities of beer. 
Sometimes these beer thefts, more commonly known as “beer runs,” turn violent when 
clerks and good Samaritans attempt to intervene. Additional analyses, which included 
                                                        
17 Questions included multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, and short answer. 
18 Founded in 1951, Circle K is a convenience store retail chain which self-reports more 
than 7,500 stores worldwide (Circle K, 2014). 
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multiple environmental design assessments done at Circle K stores, helped the Glendale 
SPI team to conclude: 
...Circle K management practices were largely responsible for the theft 
problem. These practices included inadequate staffing, especially during 
high-risk theft times; failure to respond to panhandling, loitering, and 
graffiti; and violations of basic CPTED principles, such as keeping open 
lines of sight, employee personal items stored in plain view, and placing 
products in at-risk locations. (White & Balkcom, 2012, p. 5) 
 
A multi-pronged response plan was developed by officers, civilians, crime 
analysts, and ASU faculty by engaging in open dialogue during training sessions. The 
proposed responses included: intervention with Circle K leadership, crime suppression 
strategies, and prevention efforts at the six highest-activity stores. The intervention called 
for proposed changes to practices and operations, including more than 220 CPTED 
recommendations to address issues at the six target stores. For example, the Glendale SPI 
team suggested changes to the store design and environment, as well as suggested 
employing two clerks during “hot times” (Friday and Saturday from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m.). 
The SPI team attempted to engage Circle K to change the culture in targeted locations, 
and had some initial successes with Circle K engagement. This included: Glendale Police 
Department training and access to in-store surveillance systems, trespass authorization 
approval, Circle K victim impact statements to be used during criminal prosecution of 
offenders, CADMINE alerts (Glendale Police Department email to Circle K loss 
prevention supervisor immediately after call for service), data sharing (Circle K repeat 
offender file), Circle K representative at bi-weekly SPI meetings, and a meeting with 
corporate Circle K leaders. 
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The traditional suppression strategy consisted of targeted surveillance and 
enforcement operations at the six intervention stores during nine weekends in August and 
September of 2010, as well as periodically through 2011. Circle K security guards, 
Glendale Police Department squads, ICE agents, and others were included in these 
operations. Arrestees were also debriefed by the ASU researchers. These operations 
resulted in 48 arrests, nearly $900 in recovered merchandise, the identification of two 
distinct offender groups (prolific, serious offenders and juveniles who were “party 
hopping”), and learning that nearly one fourth of offenders were juveniles. The salience 
of prevention was highlighted because of the prevalence of juveniles committing the 
crimes. The team identified underage “beer runs” at Circle K stores to be an underlying 
cause of much of the crime problem. A public service announcement video was created19 
to address the issue of beer theft. 
The team assessed their multi-pronged approach and found mixed results. Circle 
K was generally not responsive to the intervention recommendations, and did not alter 
their practices. That said, several store managers did follow the CPTED 
recommendations, but adherence was not consistent across stores. White and Balkcom 
(2012) noted “...the Glendale team experienced resistance from Circle K management. 
Straightforward CPTED recommendations were often ignored, especially those that 
required a financial commitment” (p. 6). The SPI team responded by creating a law 
enforcement working group that included agencies from neighboring cities (White & 
Balkcom, 2012). This working group created a collective voice in speaking to Circle K, 
and increased leverage on the corporate leadership (White & Balkcom, 2012). The SPI 
                                                        
19 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQZ6s2BTAo8. 
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team’s second response was to publicly shame Circle K by presenting the findings to the 
local media20 (White & Balkcom, 2012). This tactic was successful in getting Circle K re-
interested in discussing the problem and modification of their practices (White & 
Balkcom, 2012).  
The methodology employed by White and Katz (2013) for the assessment of the 
SPI was descriptive, examining changes in calls for service over time for all 65 
convenience stores in the city of Glendale. Specifically, ANOVA was employed to 
examine mean monthly changes in calls for service between the pretest period (August 
2009-July 2010) and the posttest period (August 2011-July 2012). There were statistically 
significant drops in calls for service at five of the six target Circle K stores. Calls for 
service at nine non-SPI Circle K stores in Glendale also experienced a drop in crime, but 
these findings were not statistically significant (White & Katz, 2013). The impact on the 
target stores was unique. Although White and Katz (2013) concluded that the Smart 
Policing Initiative led to significant declines in crime and disorder at the targeted 
convenience stores, the authors specifically call for a more sophisticated analysis, likely 
time series, to offer a detailed and longer-term picture of the intervention. Additionally, 
their study did not examine displacement or diffusion of benefits resulting from the 
intervention. The SPI may have displaced crime to the surrounding area, or may have 
improved neighboring crime. By examining displacement/diffusion, changes in crime and 
call type, and using a more sophisticated analysis (growth curve modeling), this 
dissertation seeks to build on White and Katz (2013). The Glendale SPI is one of the few 
                                                        
20 For example, see: 
http://www.azcentral.com/community/glendale/articles/2011/07/10/20110710asu-study-
circle-k-police-calls.html. 
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documented cases of POP being implemented as envisioned by Goldstein. Building on 
this study will create a stronger evidence-base for problem-oriented policing by allowing 
this initiative’s effect size to be included in future meta-analyses, as well as discussions 
of ideal applications of POP as envisioned by Goldstein. Additionally, the discussion and 
conclusions will add to the limited extant literature on corporate involvement in crime, as 
Circle K’s potential complicity in the crime at their stores is examined. 
Research Questions 
Question 1: Did the POP intervention generate an effect on crime at the target Circle K 
stores, compared to the non-target stores? 
Question 1a: What was the strength and duration of the POP intervention’s effects? 
Question 2: Did crime change over time in the area surrounding the target Circle K 
stores? If so, does this finding suggest displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits? 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Dependent Variable 
All data for the analyses have been provided by the Glendale Police Department. 
The dependent variable for these analyses is all monthly calls for service21 from January 
                                                        
21 Calls for service have long been regarded as a reliable indicator of time and place 
variations in crime (Pierce, Spaar, & Briggs, 1988). Since the utility of calls for service 
has been recognized, much of the research on crime and place has been effectively using 
these data in analyses (e.g., Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Bursik, Grasmick, & Chamlin, 
1990; LeBeau, 2002; Sherman et al., 1989; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Warner & 
Pierce, 1993). However, the data have limitations; specifically, calls for service may not 
match with official statistics. Different measures of crime have been shown to yield 
disparate findings (Elliot & Ageton, 1980; Hindelang, 1976; Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 
1979, 1981). Discrepant findings have also been shown to be due to the actual study 
design (Weisburd, Lum, & Petrosino, 2001). Issues with self-report measures are widely 
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2008 to October 2013 at all 7422 convenience stores in Glendale, Arizona (70 time points 
per store). Displacement of crime and/or diffusion of benefits resulting from the 
intervention will be assessed using data on all calls for service in the 500-yard catchment 
area around the six target Circle K stores from January 2008 to October 2013. The target 
Circle K stores are located at: (1) 4306 W Maryland, (2) 5880 W Camelback, (3) 5907 W 
Bethany Home, (4) 5102 W Camelback, (5) 7428 N 51st Ave., and (6) 4648 W. Bethany 
Home. In addition to the six Circle K stores targeted for the intervention, there are other 
Circle K stores in the sample (n = 13). The 13 Circle K stores that did not receive the 
intervention will serve as one comparison group in this study. The second comparison 
group is comprised of the 68 convenience stores that did not receive an intervention.23 
There are 74 total convenience stores in the sample (N = 74). Data management was 
conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 and ArcGIS 10.2. 
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable in this dissertation is the policing intervention. 
This was coded as a binary variable, if a store received the intervention or not. The SPI 
intervention began and ended at all of the target stores at the same time, August 2010 – 
                                                                                                                                                                     
documented and long-established (for e.g. see: Huizinga & Elliot, 1986; Levine, 1976; 
Short & Nye, 1957, 1958; Skogan, 1975), as are issues with official crime data (Geerken, 
1994; Skogan, 1975). Although bias may exist within calls for service data, this issue is 
not specific to one type of measurement in criminal justice. 
22 White and Katz (2013) examined 65 convenience stores in their analyses, 15 of which 
were Circle K stores. This dissertation examines 74 total stores, 19 of which are Circle K 
stores. This discrepancy is likely due to White and Katz receiving incomplete 
convenience store data for their initial study. 
23 This larger comparison group includes the 13 Circle K stores that did not receive the 
intervention. The Circle K stores were parsed out to create a second comparison group 
that would allow Circle K stores that received the intervention to be compared to Circle 
K stores that did not receive the intervention. 
  60 
July 2011. The data were coded as being pre-intervention (January 2008-July 2010), 
intervention (August 2010-July 2011), or post-intervention (August 2011-October 2013), 
for all stores (intervention and comparison). These time periods have 31, 12, and 27 data 
points, respectively. Additionally, an interaction term for the post-intervention period and 
the policing intervention is included to test the moderating effects of these variables on 
each other. 
Analytical Strategy 
Difference-in-Difference 
Several methods24 associated with longitudinal analyses could be used to examine 
a POP project’s influence, including, for example, interrupted time series25, but a 
difference in difference (DID) technique will be used in this dissertation. This type of 
model allows for the estimation of inter-store effects in intra-individual change over time 
(Curran, Obeidat, & Losardo, 2010). DID is a quasi-experimental technique that can be 
used to understand the effects of a policy implementation. By examining cross-sectional 
and time series’ differences, the DID estimator is a fixed-effects design which avoids the 
                                                        
24 Currently, trajectory approaches are often used as an assessment method in policing 
literature. Trajectory modeling is inappropriate for this dissertation for several reasons: 
(1) the sample size of convenience stores is relatively small (n = 74), (2) trajectory 
modeling examines between-group changes and this dissertation is concerned with both 
inter- and intra-store changes, and (3) trajectory models have to be optimized; this can be 
subjective and there is a tendency to reify groups. Refer to Sampson and Laub (2005) and 
Nagin and Tremblay (2005a, 2005b) for debate about the appropriateness and adequacy 
of trajectory modeling, and the meaning of group membership more generally. 
25 ARIMA, or autoregressive integrated moving average, could have been used for this 
analysis. ARIMA is particularly sensitive to values of zero, but will fit a time series 
model anyway. This leads to a nonsensical model, which is not evident unless the 
methodologist is aware of this limitation of ARIMA. This dissertation will not be using 
ARIMA because many of the comparison stores reported zero calls for service for several 
months; low base rates do not bias or misspecify difference in difference models. 
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threat of differences between- and within-group biasing the model; essentially this design 
mimics an experimental design not affected by selection bias issues. Acknowledging the 
practical necessity that most program evaluation must be done with nonexperimental 
techniques, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) devised a new methodology to work with this 
data limitation. In one of the most recognized DID examples, Card and Krueger (1994) 
assessed the impact of minimum wage increases on employment. Using data measured at 
two time points, the minimum data requirement to run a DID model, the authors 
controversially found that minimum wage increases led to an increase in employment. 
New Jersey received the “treatment”, that is the increase in wages, and Pennsylvania was 
used as a control or comparison (because the state did not alter their wage structure 
during this time). New Jersey experienced an increase in employment pre- and post- the 
minimum wage increase, while Pennsylvania experienced a decrease. The difference 
between these two figures is the DID estimator. This is illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3. Difference in Difference Example 
 Pre Post Post-Pre Difference 
Treatment Y0
T Y1
T Y1
T - Y0
T 
Control Y0
C Y1
C Y1C- Y0
C 
T-C Difference Y0T- Y0
C Y1T- Y1
C (Y1T- Y1
C) – (Y0T- Y0
C) 
 
Negative Binomial Regression 
This dissertation seeks to determine if there is a decrease in calls for service in the 
targeted group of convenience stores and, if so, whether it is significantly greater than the 
decrease in the non-targeted group of stores. To supplement the DID estimator, which 
analyzes raw counts, a negative binomial regression model will also be used, which 
  62 
employs rates. The calls for service in this dissertation are a form of count data, and 
require a Poisson-based estimator to predict variation in the dependent variable. If the 
count-dependent variable is overdispersed (with respect to a Poisson distribution), or the 
variance is greater than its mean, a negative binomial regression model becomes 
appropriate. Negative binomial models adjust the variance (i.e., overdispersion) 
independently of the mean by incorporating both a mean and variance parameter into the 
model (Osgood, 2000). This analysis will be conducted using Stata/IC 14. The Stata code 
used reflects a longitudinal negative binomial random effects model. 
Theoretically and statistically a random effects model is appropriate for this 
analysis. A random effects model will allow for individual store effects, as there is no 
within store variation in treatment (making fixed effects inappropriate). A Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test, performed to test bias and inefficiency of fixed versus random effects 
models, concluded that the null hypothesis that differences in coefficients are systematic 
cannot be rejected (χ2 = 15.71, p = 1). Because of this, a random effects model should be 
employed. 
Effect Size 
Many social scientists, particularly outside of the field of criminology, consider 
null-hypothesis significance testing (NHST) to be insufficient for interpreting data 
(Berkson, 1938; Cohen, 1994; Loftus, 1996; Lykken, 1968; Meehl, 1978; Snyder & 
Lawson, 1993). Some of the limitations of NHST are as follows: (1) NHST lacks falsify-
ability and therefore cannot fully answer research questions (Cohen, 1994; Ferguson, 
2009; Kirk, 1996), (2) no two sample means are ever identical, resulting in efforts to find 
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any difference as significant26 (Ferguson, 2009; Tukey, 1991), and (3) p levels are 
arbitrary,27 leading to different conclusions from equal treatment effects (Ferguson, 2009; 
Kirk, 1996). Alternatively, effect sizes are a way to grasp the comparative magnitude of 
an intervention by producing standardized coefficients. 
Ferguson (2009) categorizes effect sizes into four general classifications: group 
difference indices, strength of association indices, corrected estimates, and risk estimates 
(also see: Kline, 2004; Vacha-Haase & Thompson, 2004). Group difference indices 
examine the magnitude of difference between groups, using Cohen’s d to determine the 
significance of the magnitude of the effect size. Cohen (1988) defined d as the difference 
between the means, divided by the standard deviation of each group. Effect sizes are 
considered small, medium, and large if d is 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
In this dissertation, the data in the intervention and comparison groups are 
dissimilar; specifically, the volume of calls for service differs. Because of this, examining 
proportional differences rather than mean differences in both groups’ response to the 
intervention is a more appropriate effect size analysis. Odds ratio statistics, specifically 
relative effect size (RES) calculations, estimate the extent of association between two 
binary variables; in this case, the intervention and time period. Farrington, Gill, Waples, 
and Argomaniz (2007) used this measure to conduct a meta-analysis of quasi-
experimental multi-site closed-circuit television (CCTV) projects. Implementation issues, 
                                                        
26 Ferguson notes “sampling error is underestimated in NHST when sampling is 
nonrandom” (2009, p. 532). This provides one reason to supplement NHST with effect 
size calculations because the sample in this dissertation is nonrandom, making NHST 
somewhat futile. 
27 “Surely God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05” (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989, p. 
1277). 
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specifically the lack of randomized controlled designs in the projects evaluated, created 
comparability issues for Farrington et al. (2007). Welsh and Farrington (2002), in a 
previous evaluation of the crime prevention effects of closed-circuit television, found that 
the only comparable data that were consistently reported was the number of crimes 
before and after implementation of the projects. This finding led to the authors 
repurposing the odds ratio as a measure of effect size: 
RES = (a*d)/(b*c) 
Table 4. Relative Effect Size (RES) 
 
Before After 
Experimental a b 
Control c d 
 
In order to assess the strength and generality of the intervention’s effectiveness, 
and to enable this project to be compared to other POP endeavors, RES will be calculated 
(see Table 4). This statistic is easily translated into Cohen’s d, and other effect size 
measures. Inclusion in meta-analysis requires standardized effect size calculations, for 
comparative reasons (see: Lipsey & Wilson, 1993, 2001). Effect sizes are also used for 
calculating cost-benefit-analyses (Petitti, 2000). Further, relative effect size assumes a 
Poisson process, and is most applicable for comparisons of small areas (Farrington et al., 
2007). Three effect sizes will be calculated: pre-intervention to intervention, intervention 
to post-intervention, and pre-intervention to post-intervention. Additionally, confidence 
intervals (CIs) will also be reported. This allows for effects across studies to be 
compared, for precision of the estimates to be evaluated, and for examining CIs across 
studies (allowing for an eventual accurate estimate of parameters) (Schmidt, 1996; 
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Vacha-Haase & Thompson, 2004; Wilkinson & Task Force on Statistical Inference, 
1999). 
Phi, Weighted Displacement Quotient, & Crime Type 
In order to answer the second research question and assess any displacement of 
crime or diffusion of benefits, phi and the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ) will be 
employed. Prior to measuring the WDQ, Ratcliffe and Breen (2011) suggest calculating 
phi. The phi statistic will show if there is a statistically significant difference between 
crime in the buffer area and the target area. If so, proceeding with the WDQ is logical. If 
phi suggests there is no association, calculation of the WDQ is unwarranted. This study 
employs a 500-yard catchment area to assess any displacement of crime or diffusion of 
benefits. In the Southwest United States, 500 yards equates to about 2.84 blocks, or 
approximately 1500 feet. Phi is calculated as follows: 
𝚽 =  √(
𝒙𝟐
𝑵
) 
Table 5 provides the interpretation for the calculated phi value. A phi close to 
zero indicates no predictive measure of association between the target and buffer areas. If 
a phi greater than 0.1 (and below 0.3) is calculated, it is appropriate to move onto 
calculating the WDQ; there is no direct correlation between the two areas and there is no 
assumption of spatial autocorrelation (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011). Further, phi values 
below 0.3 indicate that a buffer is appropriately sized. A phi greater than 0.3, though, 
indicates a direct correlation between the buffer and target zones, and no need to run the 
subsequent WDQ. In this case, “it is likely that displacement or diffusion has been an 
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automatic outcome of the operation due to the close association between target and 
displacement area” (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011, p. 236). 
Table 5. Interpretation of Phi (Φ) Values 
Phi Value Interpretation 
0 < Phi < 0.1 No predictive measure of association between the target and buffer areas 
0.1 < Phi < 0.3 Moderate (positive or negative) association 
Phi > 0.3 No reason to run WDQ (target and displacement area close association) 
Note. These values and interpretations are sourced from Ratcliffe & Breen (2011). 
The WDQ equation contains two parts, whereby the first set of parentheses 
describes the measure of displacement or diffusion in the buffer area, and the second set 
of parentheses captures the success of the intervention (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011). Table 6 
outlines the interpretation of the quotient produced. The equation for the WDQ is as 
follows: 
WDQ = (Bt1/Ct1 – Bt0/Ct0)/(At1/Ct1 – At0/Ct0) 
In the equation provided by Bowers and Johnson (2003), A is the count of crime 
events in the target area, B is the count of crime events in the buffer area, C is the count 
of crime events in the control area, t1 is the time of the intervention, and t0 is the pre-
intervention time period. A WDQ greater than or equal to 0 indicates that displacement of 
crime is likely not occurring. 
There can be benefits to crime displacement, however, if it does occur. 
Displacement of crime can indicate that some people have avoided victimization (Barnes, 
1995). Benign displacement is another possible benefit; there is a change in offense type, 
whereby the offender is now committing a less serious crime than those prevented (Barr 
& Pease, 1990). Because the WDQ only examines geographical displacement of crime or 
diffusion of benefits, additional analyses are warranted to examine if crime type changed 
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significantly. This will also allow for a greater understanding of offense displacement, as 
there is limited research on this type of crime displacement. 
Table 6. Interpretation of Weighted Displacement Quotient (WDQ) Values 
 
The calls for service around the targeted convenience stores (n = 13295) were 
recoded into 25 categories as defined by the UCR, ranging from least to most serious: (0) 
non crime, (1) runaway, (2) curfew and loitering, (3) suspicion, (4) other offenses, (5) 
vagrancy, (6) disorderly conduct, (7) liquor violations, (8) DUI, (9) offense against 
family/children, (10) gambling, (11) drugs, (12) sex offenses, (13) weapons violations, 
(14) vandalism, (15) stolen property, (16) forgery/embezzlement/fraud, (17) simple 
assault, (18) arson, (19) stolen motor vehicle, (20) larceny-theft, (21) burglary, (22) 
aggravated assault, (23) robbery, (24) rape, and (25) homicide.28 This will be examined 
via a descriptive model that depicts crime type over time, and will be assessed regardless 
of the outcomes of the spatial displacement measures (phi and WDQ). Additionally, 
because all of the buffer areas are uniform, a simple comparison of the number of crimes 
                                                        
28 See Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) for the first application of scaling procedures to 
offense seriousness. 
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falling within each catchment area will be assessed. This parsimonious assessment of 
displacement is more straightforward, and still allows for causal interpretation. 
To obtain a crime count around the intervention stores for the displacement 
analyses, address interpolation and geocoding were performed in ArcGIS 10.2. The 
geocoding process has provided a map displaying the location of the target stores in 
relation to each other. Each of the six stores has two catchment areas around it. The 
buffer is a 250-yard area around the store, and the control area is a 250-yard area around 
the buffer.29 Crime incidents in the 500-yard area around the target stores are geocoded to 
be included in either the buffer or control areas. There is no overlap between these stores. 
In other words, a target store never appears in the catchment area of another target store. 
CHAPTER 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DIAGNOSTICS 
Study Site & Sample 
This study examines crime at and in the areas surrounding convenience stores in 
Glendale, AZ from 2008 to 2013. Glendale is located in the northwest corner of the 
Phoenix metro area. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2010 Glendale, AZ had a 
population of 226,721. The residents were mostly White (67.8%), with smaller 
percentages of Black (6.0%), Asian (3.9%), American Indian/Alaskan Native (1.7%), and 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander (0.2%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Over a third  
                                                        
29 There is no standardized catchment area in the displacement literature. For example, in 
their article putting forth the WDQ technique, Bowers and Johnson (2003) used 400-
meter buffers. In Weisburd et al.’s (2006) seminal displacement study, the authors used 
both one- and two-block catchment areas. Rules of thumb related to choosing catchment 
areas consider physical obstructions or natural boundaries (Brantingham & Brantingham, 
2000; Weisburd et al., 2006), displacement contamination (Weisburd & Green, 1995b), 
and familiarity decay (Eck, 1993). Succinctly, Bowers and Johnson (2003) state: 
“displacement is most likely to occur within close proximity to a treatment area (where 
familiarity is highest)” (p. 279). 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics (N=74) 
Store Type/Address n Store Type/Address n 
Circle K 
     4306 W. Maryland Ave.* 
     5880 W. Camelback Rd.*  
     5907 W. Bethany Home Rd.* 
     5102 W. Camelback Rd.* 
     7428 N. 51st Ave.* 
     4648 W. Bethany Home Rd.* 
     6305 W. Maryland Ave. 
     13843 W. Glendale Ave. 
     20203 N. 67th Ave. 
     20207 N. 59th Ave. 
     5049 W. Peoria Ave. 
     5430 N. 59th Ave. 
     5902 W. Bell Rd. 
     5902 W. Camelback Rd. 
     5908 W. Thunderbird Rd. 
     6002 W. Grand Ave. 
     6937 N. 75th Ave. 
     7870 W. Bell Rd. 
     9002 N. 47th Ave. 
Dollar Store 
     5105 W. Glendale Ave. 
     5275 N. 59th Ave. 
     5805 W. Thunderbird Rd. 
     6430 W. Glendale Ave. 
     6601 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
Quick Trip 
     5082 W. Grand Ave. 
     6702 W. Glendale Ave. 
     7802 N. 43rd Ave. 
7-Eleven 
     12204 N. 51st Ave. 
     6010 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
Chevron 
     5103 W. Peoria Ave. 
     9031 W. Northern Ave. 
Shell 
     5904 W. Greenway Rd. 
     6705 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
Cactus Market 
     12252 N. 51st Ave. 
Teeba Market 
     15232 N. 59th Ave. 
Geno’s Market 
     15414 N. 67th Ave. 
Northern Mini Marts Inc. 
     4301 W. Northern Ave. 
Diamond D Liquors & Market 
     4316 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
Come-N-Go Market 
     4432 W. Peoria Ave. 
Somer Market 
     4935 W. Glendale Ave. 
Amerigas Propane LP 
     5140 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
Star Mini Mart 
     5270 N. 59th Ave. 
PMH Food Mart 
     5438 N. 59th Ave. 
Two Brothers Market 
     5508 N. 43rd Ave. 
19 
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3 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Sargent Market 
     5601 W. Glendale Ave. 
Pronto Mart 
     5635 N. 59th Ave 
Stop in Market 
     5710 N. 67th Ave. 
Ali Mart LLC 
     5820 N. 43rd Ave. 
AJ Minimart & Check Cashing LLC 
     5828 W. Camelback Rd. 
Glendale Mini Mart & Gas 
     5904 W. Glendale Ave. 
Diamond Shamrock Refining Marketing Co. 
     5905 W. Cactus Rd. 
Z Mart 
     5954 W. Bethany Home Rd. 
I&D Mart 
     6031 N. 67th Ave. 
Country Market IV 
     6108 W. Northern Ave. 
3 Way Stylist/Super Carniceria 
     6114 N. 59th Ave. 
Sunset Mini Mart 
     6204 N. 43rd Ave. 
Roselane Market 
     6205 N. 59th Ave. 
Bell Tower Market & Liquor 
     6302 W. Bell Rd. 
El Gallito Market LLC 
     6311 W. Maryland Ave. 
Super Carniceria El Tarachi Inc. 
     6402 W. Glendale Ave. 
Happy Market 
     6425 N. 47th Ave. 
Upstairs Hair/Express Food Mart 
     6445 N. 51st Ave. 
Glendale Market 
     6448 W. Glendale Ave. 
43rd Ave. Market 
     6520 N. 43rd Ave. 
Glendale Quick Mart 
     6530 W. Glendale Ave. 
Handimart Corp. 
     6548 N. 59th Ave. 
Arizona Convenience Grocers Inc. 
     6604 W. Olive Ave. 
24-7 Go Green Pump LLC 
     6614 N. 58th Ave. 
Phoenix Market Center Corner LLC 
     6702 W. Camelback Rd. 
Quick Convenience LLC 
     6705 W. Bell Rd. 
Grand Stop 4 
     6707 W. Glendale Ave. 
Sinclair Gas 
     7504 W. Glendale Ave. 
Quick Stop 
     7938 N. 59th Ave. 
Arco AM/PM 
     9920 W. Glendale Ave. 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
   
* Denotes intervention store. 
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(35.5%) of residents reported being Hispanic or Latino. Approximately half of the 
residents reported being female (50.9%). A majority of residents (83.3%) over the age of 
25 reported having a high school diploma or higher, which is comparable to the national 
statistic (86.3%); 21.6% reported having a Bachelor’s degree or higher. The median 
household income in Glendale was $46,855 (in 2014 dollars), which falls below the 
national median income of $53,482; 21.7% of the residents reported living in poverty. 
 The sample is comprised of 74 convenience stores in Glendale, AZ that were in 
business from January 2008 until at least October 2013. Of these stores, 19 were Circle  
K’s (6 of which received the intervention). The convenience stores varied in type (see 
Table 7 for the store name and address). Most of the store types had an n of 1, but a few 
of the stores were franchised and/or had multiple locations. The stores were located 
throughout Glendale, although most of the stores were located near a major route (US 
60). Figure 1 details the location, and type of store (i.e., Circle K intervention, Circle K 
comparison, or other). 
Calls for Service 
 The data for these analyses were obtained from the Glendale Police Department. 
These calls for service occurred from January 2008 to October 2013. The calls for service 
at the six intervention stores (n = 13,295) made up more than half of all calls for service 
during this time (N = 24,549). Figure 2 displays the calls for service over time at the six 
intervention stores, partitioned by pre-intervention, intervention, and post-intervention 
periods. The calls for service appear to peak in the pre-intervention period, but drop in 
the intervention and post-intervention months. The average monthly calls for service for 
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all of the convenience stores in the sample was 4.74 (SD = 8.97), whereas the average 
monthly calls for service for the six intervention stores was 26.88 (SD = 13.63). 
The types of calls at the six intervention stores varied from non-crimes to very serious 
crimes like homicide. In addition to the problematic number of calls for service the 
intervention stores experienced (far surpassing the number of calls for service at the other 
convenience stores in the sample), the Glendale Police Department and the research team 
chose to implement this problem-oriented policing intervention due to the severity of 
some of the crimes occurring at these stores (e.g., robbery, rape, aggravated assault, etc.). 
The calls for service were characterized as follows: non-crime, runaway, curfew and 
loitering, other offenses, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, liquor violations, DUI, offense 
against family/children, drugs, sex offenses, weapons violations, vandalism, stolen 
property, forgery/embezzlement/fraud, simple assault, arson, stolen motor vehicle, 
larceny, burglary, aggravated assault, robbery, rape, and homicide. 
These calls were recoded to reflect property, violent, drug, or other types of 
offenses. Property crimes include: vandalism, stolen property, arson, stolen motor 
vehicle, larceny/theft, and burglary. Violent crimes include: simple assault, aggravated 
assault, robbery, rape, and homicide. Other types of offenses included calls for service 
related to: non-crime, runaway, curfew and loitering, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, liquor 
violations, DUI, offense against family/children, prostitution/sex offenses, weapons 
violations, forgery/embezzlement/fraud, and other offenses. Calls for service related to 
drug crimes were also examined. Table 8 details the number and type of calls for service 
at each of the six intervention stores, by study period. The data detailing the type of calls 
for service at the intervention stores was available from January 2009 to October
  73 
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2013.30 5907 West Bethany Home Road experienced the most calls during this period (n 
= 5521), followed by 4648 West Bethany Home Road (n = 2630), 5880 West Camelback 
Road (n = 2464), 4306 West Maryland Avenue (n = 1300), 7428 North 51st Avenue (n = 
994), and 5102 West Camelback Road (n = 386). To put this into context, 5907 West 
Bethany Home received about 3 calls for service per day, on average, during this time 
period. 
Model Diagnostics 
The calls for service data are non-normally distributed (with skewness of 3.17 and 
kurtosis of 15.28; see Figure 3), indicating that OLS regression is inappropriate. Most of 
the stores in the sample have very few monthly calls for service, with the intervention 
stores being outliers in this regard. Indeed, Figure 3 depicts 36.02% of the monthly calls 
for service as having values of zero, whereas 1.19% of monthly calls for service at the six 
intervention stores have values of zero. The variance of calls for service (80.44) is several 
times larger than the mean (M = 4.74, SD = 8.97), which suggests the need for a model 
using a Poisson or negative binomial distribution. Negative binomial regression and 
Poisson regression can be used for over-dispersed count data, but an additional parameter 
of the negative binomial distribution adjusts the variance independently of the mean. In 
other words, a negative binomial model is more flexible than Poisson regression and is 
preferable in this instance. 
An assumption of difference in difference modeling is the lead/parallel 
assumption test. This assumption posits that the time trends, in the absence of the 
                                                        
30 Note that one year of data is missing from the front end of the study period for this 
analysis. 
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Figure 3. Histogram of Calls for Service at All Convenience Stores, January 2008 – 
October 2013. 
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intervention, are the same in both groups. Violation of this assumption can over- or 
understate a treatment effect. According to Abadie (2005), “this assumption may be 
implausible if pre-treatment characteristics that are thought to be associated with the 
dynamics of the outcome variable are unbalanced between the treated and the untreated 
group” (p. 2). A t-test of the difference in average growth rates across the treatment and 
comparison groups during the pre-intervention period can be used to test this assumption. 
If the parallel trends assumption is valid, the t-test will not be statistically significant. An 
independent sample t-test, assuming unequal variances, found that the data violated the 
parallel trend assumption (t = -25.47, p <.001). Because of this, interpretation of the 
difference-in-difference results should be done with caution. Models reducing the sample 
from all convenience stores to solely Circle K convenience stores are estimated to lessen 
the selection bias effect, and are presented in addition to the models containing all stores.  
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
Two difference-in-difference models were estimated for the analyses. The first 
model examined all 74 convenience stores in the sample. As expected, the model in Table 
9 shows a significant difference in calls for service at the baseline period between the 
treatment and comparison stores, as well as during the follow-up period. Most 
importantly, the difference-in-difference between the baseline and follow-up (pre- and 
post-treatment) is statistically significant. This indicates that a statistically significant 
treatment effect of the intervention is in fact observable. 
Moving to the second model in Table 9, the sample is reduced to include only 
Circle K stores. This estimation provides similar results to the full sample, strengthening 
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support for the existence of statistically significant intervention effects of the POP 
project. The explained variance does drop slightly to 0.44 (from 0.54 in the full model) in 
the reduced model. These findings also demonstrate that the crime control effects 
extended beyond the grant period; the intervention efforts were sustainable and longer-
term. 
Negative Binomial Regression 
 Again, two models were estimated: a model including the full sample and a model 
including only Circle K convenience stores (see Table 10). The negative binomial models 
include an interaction term between the intervention stores and the post-intervention 
period (i.e., the difference-in-difference estimate). Negative binomial coefficients are not 
interpreted intuitively, and can be transformed for clarity. According to Long (1997), one 
way to interpret the results of the negative binomial model is by exponentiating the 
coefficients, subtracting one, and multiplying the result by 100 or (100*[exp(B)-1]). This 
provides the estimated percentage change in calls for service associated with a one-unit 
change in a given independent variable. 
The intervention stores and the post-intervention period both played a statistically 
significant role in the estimation of both models. The full model indicates that calls for 
service were 938.12% greater for the stores that received the intervention, compared to 
the stores that did not receive the intervention. This is expected, as the intervention stores 
are outliers in terms of the large number of calls for service they receive (comparatively). 
The post-intervention period also exhibited a decline in calls for service (5.82%), albeit 
not significantly. The interaction term is particularly relevant in understanding the overall 
study effects. Stores that received the intervention experienced a 16.47% reduction
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in calls for service from the pre-intervention to the post-intervention period relative to 
non-intervention stores. 
The results are tempered by reducing the analysis to include just the Circle K 
convenience stores. This may seem counter-intuitive but, because the Circle K stores are 
more alike than dissimilar, the intervention effects are not as pronounced in this 
subsample as compared to the other convenience stores (that received very few calls for 
service). The interaction term in this model indicates that calls for service decreased, but 
is not statistically significant and therefore not interpretable. The intervention Circle K 
stores experienced an increase in calls for service (293.54%), whereas all Circle K stores 
in the post-intervention period generally declined (15.63%). An assessment of the calls 
for service by store may provide insight into these findings. 
It is likely that the intervention had differential impacts on the individual stores 
due to inconsistent doses of the intervention, the stores having a different magnitude of 
problems at baseline, and/or because the store managers responded differently to the 
recommended changes to store design. In their original assessment, White and Katz 
(2013) performed an ANOVA examining differences in calls for service between time 
periods and found significant differences for five of the six intervention stores (with 7428 
N. 51st Ave. being the exception). Results of the t-tests in Table 11 demonstrate 
differences in each intervention store, by time period. The table compares calls for 
service in the pre-intervention and intervention periods, and in the pre-intervention and 
post-intervention periods. There are several statistically significant findings in Table 11 
that highlight individual differences within the treatment stores. 
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Results of the independent samples t-tests for this analysis show that calls for 
service at 7428 N. 51st Ave. did not differ pre-intervention to intervention (t = 0.47, df = 
26.26) or pre-intervention to post-intervention (t = 1.07, df = 51.23), similarly to White 
and Katz (2013). The store located at 4306 W. Maryland also did not exhibit statistically 
Table 11. T-Test Results for Intervention Stores by Intervention Period 
 Intervention Period  
95% CI 
(Combined) 
  
 Pre-Intervention  Intervention   
 M SD  M SD t df 
4306 W. Maryland 40.23 14.93  39.25 10.33 35.74, 44.17 0.24 29.01 
5880 W. Camelback 29.74 17.92  44.67 8.40 28.63, 39.18 -3.70*** 39.24 
5907 W. Bethany Home 31.29 18.69  18.00 4.24 22.33, 32.83 3.72*** 36.74 
5102 W. Camelback 30.03 9.30  21.33 5.26 24.77, 30.44 3.85*** 34.96 
7428 N. 51st Ave. 25.35 8.89  24.17 6.78 22.47, 27.58 0.47 26.26 
4648 W. Bethany Home 23.87 7.30  20.92 5.55 20.92, 25.18 1.43 26.34 
 
Pre-Intervention 
 
Post-
Intervention 
 
95% CI 
(Combined) 
  
 M SD  M SD t df 
4306 W. Maryland 40.23 14.93  31.85 10.78 32.72, 39.93 2.47* 54.24 
5880 W. Camelback 29.74 17.92  35.11 12.15 28.14, 36.35 -1.35 52.99 
5907 W. Bethany Home 31.29 18.69  19.30 6.56 21.63, 29.78 3.34** 38.21 
5102 W. Camelback 30.03 9.30  13.26 5.96 19.19, 25.26 8.28*** 51.68 
7428 N. 51st Ave. 25.35 8.89  22.59 10.52 21.52, 26.62 1.07 51.23 
4648 W. Bethany Home 23.87 7.30  13.89 5.60 17.06, 21.39 5.88*** 55.16 
Note: Satterthwaite approximation employed due to unequal group variances. 
***p < .001. 
**p < .01. 
*p < .05. 
 
significant declines in calls for service pre-intervention to intervention (t = 0.24, df = 
29.01), but did display a significant decline pre-intervention to post-intervention (t = 
2.47, df = 54.24, p < .05). Likewise, 4638 W. Bethany Home did not have statistically 
significant declines pre-intervention to intervention (t = 1.43, df = 26.34), but calls for 
service significantly declined pre- to post-intervention (t = 5.88, df = 55.16, p <.001). 
Interestingly, 5880 W. Camelback exhibited significant increases in calls for service pre-
intervention to intervention (t = -3.70, df = 39.24, p < .001). This store also experienced 
an increase in mean calls for service pre- to post-intervention, but this finding was not 
  82 
significant. 5880 W. Camelback was the only intervention store to experience an increase 
in mean calls for service, possibly as a result of the intervention. 5907 W. Bethany Home 
and 5102 W. Camelback were the two stores that exhibited statistically significant 
declines in both comparative time periods. 5907 W. Bethany Home experienced 
significant declines pre-intervention to intervention period (t = 3.72, df = 36.74, p < 
.001), as did 5102 W. Camelback (t = 3.85, df = 34.96, p < .001). 5907 W. Bethany 
Home also experienced significant declines pre- to post-intervention (t = 3.34, df = 38.21, 
p < .01), again as did 5102 W. Camelback (t = 8.28, df = 51.68, p <.001). 
 To this point in the analyses, the support for the intervention’s effects is generally 
positive. The difference-in-difference estimation found a statistically significant 
treatment effect for both the full sample and the Circle K sample. Further, this effect was 
sustained for 27 months after the intervention period ended. The negative binomial 
results for the full sample also indicated support for the POP project, with intervention 
stores in the post-intervention period experiencing a 13% reduction in calls for service. 
This finding was reduced in the Circle K sample, albeit likely due to the long follow-up 
period. The results might have been sustained for a period after the intervention, but 
could have decayed to non-significant levels by October 2013. The independent samples 
t-tests were used to explore store-by-store variation in impact. Results showed that four 
of the intervention stores experienced statistically significant declines that were sustained 
until October 2013 – again, over two years after the intervention period ended. To 
supplement these analyses, relative effect size will be calculated next. 
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Relative Effect Size 
Relative effect size (RES) was calculated to compare: (1) the pre-intervention 
period with the intervention period, (2) the intervention period with the post-intervention 
period, and (3) the pre-intervention period with the post-intervention period. As shown in 
Table 12, both the full model (Model 1), including all of the convenience stores in the 
sample, and the Circle K model (Model 2), were examined. Beginning with Model 1 (N = 
24549), the relative effect size for the pre-intervention to intervention period showed 
undesirable31 results, RES < 1, 95% CI [0.91, 1.04]. The comparisons between the 
intervention and post-intervention period, RES > 1, 95% CI [1.11, 1.28], and the pre-
intervention to post-intervention period, RES > 1, 95% CI [1.10, 1.23], yielded desirable 
results. The treatment stores experienced a 16% decrease in calls for service from the 
intervention period to the post-intervention period, and a 14% decrease in calls for 
service from the pre-intervention period to the post-intervention period. 
All relative effect size calculations in Model 2 (N = 18340) produced 95% 
confidence intervals hovering around 1. The pre-intervention to intervention period, RES 
< 1, 95% CI [0.88, 1.04], the intervention to post-intervention period, RES < 1, 95% CI 
[0.97, 1.16], and the pre-intervention to post-intervention period, RES < 1, 95% CI [0.95, 
1.09], produced negligible results. These relative effect size calculations, and their 
corresponding confidence intervals, imply there is no difference in the POP intervention’s 
effect between the treatment and comparison groups. Despite these mixed results, the 
                                                        
31 If the odds ratio is 1, or if the confidence interval includes 1, the relative measure of the 
intervention’s effect is not statistically different from 0. 
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project did produce statistically significant results when examining the reduction in crime 
at convenience stores from the pre-intervention period to the post-intervention period in 
the full sample. The contradictory findings between the previous analyses and the 
inconclusive RES are not necessarily fatal. Model 2 is trending downward, indicating a 
decrease in calls for service. The length of the post-intervention period is potentially 
masking significant results in Model 2. In other words, the intervention’s effects decayed 
sooner at the Circle K stores, compared to the full sample. Additionally, Model 2 is likely 
more sensitive to the anomalous store findings revealed in the independent samples t-
tests, whereas Model 1 washed out these findings due to the larger sample. These mixed 
results are possibly due to the identified outlier, and will be unpacked further in the 
discussion. 
Phi and Weighted Displacement Quotient 
To examine the presence of displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits, phi 
and the weighted displacement quotient (WDQ) were calculated for each of the six 
intervention stores in the pre-intervention (January 2008-July 2010) to intervention 
period (August 2010-July 2011). Figure 4 displays the distribution of calls for service 
around the six intervention stores, in 250-yard concentric circles. Analysis of the calls for 
service in the target, buffer, and control areas around the six intervention stores revealed 
no association: 4306 West Maryland ( = 0.003, p < .001), 5880 West Camelback ( = 0, 
p = .841), 5907 West Bethany Home ( = 0.004, p < .001), 5102 West Camelback ( = 
0.003, p < .001), 7428 North 51st Avenue ( = 0.002, p < .05), 4648 West Bethany Home 
Road ( = 0.003, p < .001). Phi values close to 0 (between 0 and 0.1) indicate that the 
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buffer area has been delineated correctly, and there is no predictive measure of 
association between the target and buffer areas (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011).  
Because the target and buffer areas around the intervention stores operate 
independently, proceeding to the WDQ measurement is appropriate. None of the 
intervention stores exhibited displacement of crime due to the intervention. Five of the 
six intervention stores, however, had WDQ values that indicated a diffusion of benefits 
from the POP project (see Table 13). WDQ values at the following five stores are 
interpreted as demonstrating diffusion, but less than direct effects, and an overall positive 
net effect of the POP implementation: 5880 West Camelback, 5907 West Bethany Home, 
5102 West Camelback, 7428 North 51st Avenue, and 4648 West Bethany Home Road. In 
other words, the area surrounding these five stores experienced fewer calls for service as 
a direct result of the POP intervention, but these results were not as strong as the direct 
effects on the intervention stores. 
Crime Type 
 Calls for service were categorized as being related to drug crime, property crime, 
violent crime, or other types of crime. Examining the six intervention stores, by time 
period, yields interesting results about the general effects of the POP project. Table 14 
displays these findings with raw counts, and Figures 5, 6, and 7 graphically represent the 
percentage of reported crime type for each study period. Drug crime declined from the 
pre-intervention period (n = 352) to the intervention period (n = 169), but increased in the 
post-intervention period (n = 264). Despite the slight increase from the intervention to 
post-intervention period, the raw count of drug crimes was reduced from the pre-
intervention to post-intervention period. Calls for service related to drug crime made up 
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7% of the total calls for service in the pre-intervention period, but were reduced to 5% of 
the total calls in the intervention and post-intervention periods. The POP project was 
successful overall in decreasing drug crime from the pre-intervention to the post-
intervention period. This finding lasted in duration until at least October 2013, well over 
two years after the initial implementation of the project. It should be noted that though 
the total number of calls for service in the post-intervention period (compared to pre-
intervention) appear to indicate that the intervention’s effects have dissipated, this is not 
the case. Table 11 clearly displays a sustained post-intervention decline in four of the six 
intervention stores. Table 14 combines crime counts for all intervention stores, including 
the stores with previously identified anomalous responses to the intervention. 
Table 14. Count of Crime Type for Intervention Stores, by Time Period 
 Pre-Intervention Intervention Post-Intervention 
Drugs 352 (7%) 169 (5%) 264 (5%) 
Property 1948 (38%) 1275 (40%) 2167 (43%) 
Violent 861 (17%) 605 (19%) 882 (18%) 
Other 1963 (38%) 1125 (36%) 1684 (34%) 
 N = 5124 N = 3174 N = 4997 
 
Property crime was the dominant type of call for service throughout the study’s 
timeframe. Calls for service related to property crime remained relatively constant in 
terms of percentage throughout the pre-intervention (n = 1948, 38%), intervention (n = 
1275, 40%), and post-intervention periods (n = 2167, 43%). The raw count of calls for 
property offenses decreased substantially from the pre-intervention to intervention period, 
though, indicating that the project was particularly beneficial in addressing this type of 
crime. These results did not appear to be sustained in the post-intervention period, 
increasing slightly from the pre-intervention period. 
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A nontrivial fraction of the calls for service throughout the three study periods 
were associated with violent crime. This percentage of violent crime remained stable 
throughout the study, but the raw count did decrease from the pre-intervention (n = 861, 
17%) to the intervention period (n = 605, 19%); and rising to baseline levels in the post-
intervention period (n = 882, 18%). Other types of calls for service, including non-crime, 
vagrancy, and disorderly conduct, accounted for a large percentage of the crime at the 
targeted convenience stores. From the pre-intervention (n = 1963, 38%) to intervention (n 
= 1125, 36%) period, as well as the pre-intervention to post-intervention (n = 1684, 34%) 
period, other types of calls declined. The intervention was successful in altering these 
“broken windows” associated crimes. Assessing the stores individually might provide 
insight into these broader trends.  
 As depicted in Figure 5, the store located at 4306 West Maryland experienced 
relatively stable percentages of the four crime types throughout each of the study’s three 
periods. Although crime decreased slightly from the pre-intervention to post-intervention 
period, calls for service returned to approximately baseline levels in the post-intervention 
period. The calls for service at 4648 West Bethany Home provide a different picture. 
Figure 6 depicts the changes in crime type percentage at this location. Crime decreased in 
all categories in the intervention period, but property crimes and other types of offenses 
were larger post-intervention than at pre-intervention levels. Drug crimes, which 
comprised the largest percentage of calls for service pre-intervention, were replaced by 
property crimes as making up the largest percentage post-intervention. 
 
 
  91 
Figure 5. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 4306 West Maryland 
 
Figure 6. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 4648 West Bethany Home 
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Figure 7. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 5102 West Camelback 
 
 5102 West Camelback, arguably the least problematic convenience store of the 
targeted sites, saw large reductions due to the intervention. Drug crime and other types of 
offenses decreased by 20% or more from the pre-intervention to post-intervention period; 
Figure 7 displays this significant reduction. Call volume decreased during the 
intervention period at this location, and increased to slightly lower than or at baseline 
levels by post-intervention. Property crime was an outlier in this regard, and increased in 
both raw count and percentage from pre-intervention (n = 50, 31.65%) to post-
intervention (n = 61, 38.61%). Interestingly, although decreasing slightly during the 
intervention (n = 12, 28.57%), violent crime remained constant pre-intervention to post-
intervention (n = 15, 35.71%). 
 Calls for service at 5880 West Camelback related to drug and property crime, as 
displayed in Figure 8, decreased pre-intervention to post-intervention. Troublingly,  
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Figure 8. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 5880 West Camelback 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 5907 West Bethany Home 
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Figure 10. Percentage of Calls for Service Type, 7428 North 51st Avenue 
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intervention period, but by the post-intervention period drug crimes accounted for the 
smallest percentage of calls for service. Property crimes, however, represented the largest  
percentage of calls in the post-intervention period, whereas these were the smallest 
percentage pre-intervention. 
Figure 10 depicts the breakdown of type of calls for service by percentage at 7428 
North 51st Avenue. The intervention proved particularly effective at this store, reducing 
crime from pre-intervention to intervention, and pre-intervention to post-intervention. 
Drug crimes made up the majority of calls for service pre-intervention, but the post-
intervention statistics indicate that offending became more generalized. A positive sign 
for the project’s generalizability and duration, raw counts of each crime type also 
decreased from pre-intervention to post-intervention. 
Overall, the results addressing both research questions indicated effectiveness of 
the intervention, at least partially. For parsimony, see Figure 11 for a summary of these 
results by methodology. The discussion section will expand on and interpret these 
findings. 
Figure 11. Summary of Results 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
This dissertation sought to answer three main questions: (1) Did the POP 
intervention generate an effect on crime at the target Circle K stores, compared to the 
non-target stores? (1a) What was the strength and duration of the POP intervention’s 
effects? (2) Did crime change over time in the area surrounding the target Circle K 
stores? If so, does this finding suggest displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits? 
The following discussion section will summarize and interpret these results. Limitations 
of the study design and analysis will be presented, as well as the theoretical and policy 
implications. Future directions and ideas for expanding this work are included throughout 
the discussion. Concluding statements will situate this project into the broader context of 
the current state of policing. 
Summary and Interpretation of Results 
 To answer the first two research questions, difference-in-difference estimation, 
negative binomial regression, and relative effect size calculations were employed. 
Mimicking an experimental design, the difference-in-difference estimation found 
statistically significant declines in calls for service from pre- to post-intervention in both 
the full model and the Circle K only model. By answering the first research question 
affirmatively, this comparison between the treated stores and the non-target stores 
provided encouraging results regarding the intervention’s effects. Use of negative 
binomial regression allowed for modeling the overdispersion in the dependent variable, 
and the inclusion of an interaction term (treatment condition by intervention period). The 
results here were somewhat mixed. The interaction term in the full model proved 
statistically significant; that is, intervention stores in the post-intervention period 
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experienced a 13% reduction in calls for service. Reducing the model to include only the 
Circle K stores, however, caused the interaction term to drop out of the model. In other 
words, there was some underlying mechanism occurring in the Circle K model that 
caused this counter-intuitive finding. 
Initially it appeared as though selection bias might have been affecting the 
negative binomial findings. Whether this finding was due to calls for service being so 
pronounced at the intervention stores comparatively, or because the Circle K model 
included stores that were more similar than different, is unknown. Independent sample t-
tests were used to parse out the nuance in this finding, and to ascertain if individual store 
effects were biasing the results. The results of this analysis brought to light a potential 
cause of these mixed findings. More specifically, one store (5880 West Camelback) 
experienced increases in calls for service throughout the study period. This was the only 
store to prove impervious to the intervention and, moreover, to become more problematic 
during and after the POP project. Both the number of calls for service and the type of 
calls increased in severity at this store. 
The mixed results of the relative effect size calculation make sense in light of the 
identification of this store outlier. When examining the full model, the relative effect size 
(odds ratio calculation) revealed a negligible effect from pre-treatment to the intervention 
period. The effect from the intervention to post-intervention period was significant, 
however, as crime decreased by 16% at the target stores compared to the control stores. 
Most importantly, this decline was sustained (significantly) until October 2013 – a full 27 
months after the intervention ended. The statistically significant effect size calculation 
revealed a crime decrease of 14% at the target stores, compared to the non-target stores. 
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The Circle K model did not produce statistically significant effect size results in crime at 
convenience stores in Glendale, AZ, regardless of the time period examined. In short, the 
strength of the intervention varied by model, but overall the effects on crime at targeted 
convenience stores in Glendale, AZ were strong and durable. 
 The third research question moved beyond the main effects to assess the existence 
of spatial displacement of crime or diffusion of benefits as a result of the intervention. 
Additionally, changes in crime type were examined. Encouragingly, none of the target 
Circle K stores experienced spatial displacement as a result of the POP project. Further, 
five of the six target stores experienced a diffusion of benefits because of the 
intervention. This is in line with previous research on crime displacement, and speaks to 
the strength and usefulness of place-based interventions. An analysis of crime type at the 
targeted stores produced several findings. Overall, the targeted stores appeared most 
responsive to the intervention through reductions in property and disorder crimes. An 
examination of the stores individually provided insight into the mixed main effects 
results. In particular, the store located at 5880 West Camelback proved, once again, to be 
an outlier. Similarly to the other intervention stores, drug and property crime at 5880 
West Camelback decreased from pre-intervention to post-intervention. Violent crime, 
however, increased by 15% from the pre-intervention to post-intervention periods. 
Approximately 31% of the calls for service at this location were classified as violent 
crime in the pre-intervention period, and increased to account for approximately 45% of 
the calls for service in the post-intervention period. All other types of crime decreased in 
both raw count and percentage pre- to post-intervention at this location. 
  99 
This finding is especially salient for several reasons. First, it provides further 
support for the hypothesis that POP projects of this nature are most effective at reducing 
property and disorder crimes – even at the most troublesome of locations. Second, it 
indicates that crime type displacement may have occurred at this store. The Circle K 
located at 5880 West Camelback experienced increases in both the raw count and the 
percentage of violent crime. Lastly, this finding suggests that some crime-prone 
locations, or hot spots, have a stable amount of crime despite crime-reduction efforts, or, 
that place managers play an integral role in the implementation and effectiveness of 
place-based interventions. Both of these possibilities will be fleshed out below. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study do constrain the generalizability of the findings and 
thus warrant discussion. These limitations include study design issues (sample selection 
bias and the use of quasi-experimental methods over a randomized controlled trial), 
problems related to the use of longitudinal data (regression to the mean), and uncertainty 
about differential program implementation (problematically coupled with a lack of 
fidelity checks). 
Study Design 
Sample selection bias can undermine external validity, in some cases over- or 
under-stating the true intervention effects (Berk, 1983). Specifically, sample selection 
bias may affect the study outcome when longitudinal data is being analyzed. In this 
dissertation, the intervention stores experienced calls for service at a much higher rate 
than the comparison stores; the intervention stores were outliers. Regression to the mean 
(RTM) is the statistical phenomenon whereby initial, extreme measurements (or outliers) 
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tend to be closer to the average on subsequent measurements, making natural variation in 
the data look like a significant treatment effect. One limitation of this dissertation 
revolves around the stores selected for the intervention: the bias in their selection (i.e., 
not being randomly chosen for treatment) requires caution when interpreting any 
intervention effect. 
RTM assumes that a measurement reflects both a true score and an error 
component, the latter of which varies randomly (Campbell & Kenny, 1999). Pretest – 
posttest designs can mistakenly make crime-reduction programs look effective, when in 
fact the results are a byproduct of a statistical artifact (Maltz, Gordon, McDowall, & 
McCleary, 1980). In a critique of research on street lighting and crime, Marchant (2005) 
argued three points: (1) area-based crime prevention programs should be evaluated with 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), (2) yearly fluctuations in crime are so large that 
they are likely to mask intervention effects, and (3) when areas receiving an intervention 
are compared to non-equivalent control areas regression to the mean may occur. 
Farrington and Welsh (2006) forcefully assert that a “determined and destructive 
statistical assault” raising “every conceivable statistical objection” to program 
evaluations not using RCTs is bound to cause an increase in Type II errors. The authors 
ultimately conclude that RTM in area-based crime prevention research may not be all that 
important if using somewhat reasonable (albeit different) comparative crime rates. 
This was precisely the reasoning for truncating the comparison group in this study 
to include only Circle K stores. These stores, although differing in crime rates, were more 
alike than different. The comparative Circle K stores did experience significant crime, 
just not the disproportionate amount experienced by the targeted Circle K stores. Sample 
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selection bias and RTM issues are, at times, unavoidable in the implementation and 
assessment of criminal justice interventions. Eliminating these statistical quandaries is 
impractical (unless all criminological studies begin employing randomized experimental 
designs, or selecting comparably matched control stores), but quantifying their effects is 
reasonable and will significantly alter criminologists’ understanding of intervention 
effects. 
Yudkin and Stratton (1996) suggest three approaches to minimize regression to 
the mean: the use of RCTs, basing selection on several measurements, and selecting on 
one measurement and assessing treatment effect using another. The benefits of using 
RCTs to evaluate police interventions are well known, but these designs are not always 
feasible. Reasons for choosing non-experimental methods include practical difficulties, 
ethical challenges, and practitioner cooperation (see: Lum & Yang, 2005). Indeed, 
problem-oriented policing interventions in particular are notoriously difficult to 
implement via a randomized design; only four studies in Weisburd and colleagues’ 
(2008) systematic review of problem-oriented policing were randomized experiments. 
The inability to randomize is often addressed post-hoc with varying statistical 
corrections. These adjustment procedures are one way to reduce nonrandomization bias, 
but these techniques vary in their performance (Shadish, Clark, & Steiner, 2008). For 
example, Heckman’s (1976) two-step estimator is one such approach to account for 
selection bias, but this procedure is known to inflate standard errors due to collinearity 
issues between the correction term and the model’s regressors (Bushway, Johnson, & 
Slocum, 2007). Other techniques, like matching, are rendered improbable with a sample 
like the one used in this dissertation. The six intervention stores are so disparate from the 
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control stores in the sample that matching procedures are illogical. The use of a 
nonrandomized design is a limitation of this study, but adds to a growing chorus of the 
need for more randomized controlled trials in problem-oriented policing evaluations, and 
criminology more generally. 
Differential Implementation and Fidelity 
The effectiveness of well-designed interventions can become weakened in the 
field: “the intervention-as-implemented in an experiment frequently differs from the 
intervention-as-designed” (Nelson, Cordray, Hulleman, Darrow, & Sommer, 2012, p. 
374). Unfortunately, differential implementation during this POP project was likely, as 
the officers conducting the suppression response were not subject to fidelity checks. The 
convenience stores, however, did receive follow-up visits wherein checks were done to 
assess the implementation of CPTED recommendations. These checks were not uniform 
across the stores, and therefore are not included in this analysis. There are several ways to 
examine implementation in interventions, though. 
Fixsen and colleagues (2005) conceptualize intervention fidelity in community 
organizations in two ways: (1) personnel fidelity, or the implementation of the 
intervention, and (2) organizational fidelity, or the implementation of intervention 
support. The organizational fidelity in the Glendale SPI was sound – the research team 
worked with officers over a period of four months to ensure understanding of the SARA 
model, and POP more generally. Alternatively, Dane and Schneider (1998) put forth a 
comprehensive definition of “integrity verification” to assess five aspects of program 
fidelity: adherence, exposure, quality of delivery, participant responsiveness, and 
program differentiation. 
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The personnel fidelity, or exposure, is where the question of implementation 
arises. Dosage matters in criminal justice, and not just the presence or absence of an 
intervention. An intervention effect’s magnitude grows with the strength of dosage 
(Haerle, 2016). For example, some research has found that greater implementation 
fidelity is associated with greater treatment effects (e.g., Dane & Schneider, 1998; Durlak 
& DuPre, 2008). Additionally, a study specifically examining the effects of POP on crime 
and disorder found that higher treatment fidelity was related to stronger effects (Weisburd 
et al., 2010). More recent research has found, however, that disclosure of fidelity issues is 
not associated with statistical power or effect size, although this finding may be due to 
insufficient information provided by researchers (Nelson, Wooditch, & Dario, 2015). 
Future studies seeking to replicate this project would benefit from checking and 
disclosing implementation fidelity, because the extant research suggests that potentially 
stronger program effects can be obtained. 
The quality of treatment delivery and participant responsiveness varied by store. 
In fact, this may explain the unusual results at 5880 West Camelback. The researchers 
and practitioners implementing this POP project were aware of this particular issue, and 
devised approaches to combat resistance from Circle K management. This intervention 
with Circle K leadership culminated with public shaming in the form of presenting the 
results to the local media (White & Katz, 2013). This eventually facilitated further 
discussion of management practices. Knowing how to handle these types of limitations in 
the field is crucial to being able to turn the challenges of criminal justice in practice into 
an ultimately successful intervention. 
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Program adaptability is necessary if the intention is to generalize the results to 
other locales, as is the case here. Convenience store crime is a national problem and this 
POP project provided encouraging results for tackling the issue. Melde and colleagues 
(2006), discussing fidelity versus adaptability, propose clearly articulating acceptable 
degrees of variation that are reinforced through training. The POP curriculum can be 
amended to acknowledge this reality, and in the future, research partners can emphasize 
“vital versus adaptable program components” (Melde et al., 2006, p. 736). 
Theoretical Implications 
Overall, several of the theories used to frame this dissertation were supported. The 
intervention stores underwent environmental design manipulation to reduce crime 
opportunities. These CPTED implementations proved to be a powerful component in the 
Glendale POP project, increasing guardianship by improving the defensibility of the 
store’s layout. Another component of this POP project was the use of focused patrol, 
wherein officers would fill out their paperwork in the stores’ parking lots. Officers were 
able to maximize their efficiency by both completing necessary administrative matters 
and providing visible deterrence to would-be offenders. This dissertation provided 
support to the theoretical framework often used to guide problem-oriented policing, but 
also raised questions about our understanding of problem-oriented policing. Specifically, 
which elements of the project worked best? Did the CPTED recommendations alleviate 
crime in a more significant way than the focused deterrence aspects, or vice versa? This 
is parsed out below, by describing how understanding POP’s effectiveness in a more 
nuanced manner can be done via traditional crime theory assessment. 
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 Additionally, the literature used to frame this dissertation included a discussion of 
hot spots, and displacement and diffusion. Supporting extant research, results indicated 
that displacement of crime did not occur, but rather a diffusion of benefits was likely. 
This is encouraging for the study of crime and place for several reasons. Problem-
oriented policing focuses on specific problems in a community; in this case, convenience 
store crime. John Eck (1993) has concluded that “prevention and crackdown efforts 
focused on unique situations will have less displacement than prevention or crackdown 
efforts focused on general situations” (p. 537). This dissertation supported this assertion. 
By focusing efforts on specific places, with specific problems, the POP paradigm was 
successfully able to reduce crime at problematic stores without displacing criminal 
activity to neighboring areas. Encouragingly, these crime declines persisted for 27 
months after the intervention ended, highlighting the long-term impacts possible through 
POP. This is likely attributable to the robustness of the POP implementation, and raises 
intriguing policy implications regarding the correlation between strength of 
implementation and sustainable crime declines. 
Second, extant research on crime and place is consistent in demonstrating that a 
very small percentage of addresses are responsible for producing the majority of calls for 
service (e.g., Eck, Gersh, & Taylor, 2000; Pierce et al., 1988; Sherman et al., 1989; 
Spelman, 1995). Further, these crime hot spots are known to persist over long periods of 
time with a small group of micro-places disproportionately affecting crime trends 
(Weisburd et al., 2004). Circle K convenience stores were chosen for the intervention 
because, in 2010, 79% of calls for service at all convenience stores in Glendale were 
attributed to 15 Circle K stores (White & Katz, 2013). These stores, considered hot spots 
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of crime, were responsive to intervention efforts. Because hot spots do persist, and 
positive intervention effects do decay, the tactics used for this POP strategy can and 
should be continually implemented. For example, if officers are mandated to complete 
their paperwork on Circle K property, they can continue to provide deterrent effects at no 
added cost to the department or the store managers while simultaneously changing the 
perception of that location – that is, Circle K is no longer a place that will tolerate 
excessive amounts of crime. This also implies a certain amount of onus on place 
managers to work with the police and researchers to reduce persistent crime, and is 
discussed below in regards to policy implications.  
Interestingly, one of the intervention stores experienced a significant shift in 
crime type due to the intervention. Although experiencing reduced calls for service, this 
store saw an increase in violent crime reports. In some circumstances, situational crime 
prevention can backfire, and even incite defiance, frustration, and ultimately violence 
(Grabosky, 1996). If situational crime prevention efforts are perceived as excessive 
constraint, unintended effects of opportunity-reduction strategies can result (Wortley, 
1998). Wortley (1998) asserts that this does not dismiss the theoretical utility of 
situational crime prevention, but rather reinforces that counterproductive findings still 
support the concept that situations and design influence behavior. This store proved to be 
an outlier, among a group of stores that were all initially outliers, and may require further 
individualized attention or a different approach utilizing a different theoretical 
perspective. 
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Furthering Problem-Oriented Policing 
Like all criminological theories and organizational paradigms, problem-oriented 
policing has several limitations. Weisburd et al. (2010), however, provide reasonable 
evidence that POP can reduce crime and disorder. Due to these findings, Tilley (2010) 
suggests that researchers move beyond the notion that POP needs to be tested for its 
usefulness, and that the focus shift to the improvement of reliability and efficiency. 
Michael Scott, director of the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, has noted “no 
scholar has argued that the approach is fundamentally flawed, which is remarkable in the 
scholarly world where debunking theories is the norm” (Scott, 2010, p. 136). This is 
attributed to POP being understood as a process theory, rather than a substantive theory. 
Scott also suggests that POP should be evaluated “on the degree to which its process and 
principles improve the prospects for more effective policing” (2010, p. 137). With 
leading scholars in the field calling for an examination of POP’s reliability, efficiency, 
process, and principles, there is clear consensus that POP needs further scrutiny. 
POP is a guiding organizational philosophy, grounded in criminological theory. 
The nature of POP encourages criminal justice to move beyond solely examining the 
causes of crime and criminality, to better understand “the behavior of the legal system, 
the operations of the criminal justice apparatus, [and] the trends in social control” (Harris, 
2005, p. 324; see also: Kraska, 2004). Scott (2000) has contextualized the process in 
terms of the police mission, and has identified challenges to problem-oriented policing as 
an organizational philosophy. The following, however, seeks to outline how 
understanding the theoretical nuance in the theories that ground problem-oriented 
policing can further the reliability, effectiveness, and precision of the process. 
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 One way to assess problem-oriented policing is to apply Tittle’s (1995) features of 
adequate theory to our extant knowledge of the theories and strategies that inform POP. 
Tittle’s evaluative criteria include understanding the breadth and adequacy of the theory. 
Breadth is in constant flux, and refers to the capacity of a theory to explain a variety of 
deviant behavior (Tittle, 1995). Breadth is undoubtedly one strength of POP, with the 
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website providing guides on issues ranging from 
elderly abuse, to hate crimes, to asset forfeiture. Adequacy refers to the 
comprehensiveness, precision, and depth of a given theory (Tittle, 1995). The 
comprehensiveness component aims to account for causal explanations, and is defined by 
inclusiveness of all possible causal variables. For example, the comprehensiveness of 
POP is addressed by examining how and when it works, and if it accounts for a variety of 
spurious mechanisms that may be affecting crime. This dissertation did not include 
multiple control variables, so it is difficult to estimate the effect of all possible causal 
forces. The comprehensiveness issue of problem-oriented policing would be rectified by 
the use of randomized controlled trials, as that is the most methodologically rigorous 
approach in the sciences. The experimental design is best suited for identifying causal 
mechanisms, and would allow for a better understanding of the “how” and “why” of POP 
processes. 
 Precision seeks to answer “when” and “to what degree” a theory’s causal effects 
operate (Tittle, 1995). Causal time lags, degree of exposure, and contingencies vary by 
situation (Birbeck & LaFree, 1993), and are not clearly articulated under the current 
problem-oriented framework. This dissertation, for example, is unable to ascertain 
precisely which component of the strategy worked the best to reduce crime, or if there 
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was an interaction effect among the theory-based strategies employed that operated 
differently at the intervention stores – potentially causing the anomalous violent crime 
finding at 5880 West Camelback. Further, precision would allow researchers to identify 
which strategies used in the problem-oriented process contribute to the paradigm’s 
durability. Depth builds on this by specifying “logical rationales for the connections 
among the parts” (Tittle, 1995, p. 18). So in addition to precision seeking to identify 
which strategies used in the implementation of POP are most useful and for what 
problems, depth answers the question of how these strategies may interact to accomplish 
the end-goal. 
 The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing holds an annual conference at which 
presenters detail the POP projects they have undertaken, in order to educate practitioners 
and researchers on addressing specific problems and implementing the SARA model. The 
conference presentations, in addition to a variety of POP guides, are included on the 
website to inform thousands of monthly visitors on the theoretical background and 
practicalities of addressing crime problems. By providing, for example, effect size 
estimates for the strategies used in the response guides, the Center can more precisely 
emphasize and disseminate “what works” in problem-oriented policing in a theoretically 
informed way. Ascertaining what theoretically anchored crime-control responses 
associated with POP contribute to the durability of the process would refine the 
usefulness of each technique, ultimately contributing to the understanding of problem-
oriented initiatives as sustainable. 
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Criminality of Convenience Stores 
One facet of this dissertation was to examine how the Glendale POP project 
impacted changes in crime type at targeted convenience stores. Encouragingly, all of the 
intervention stores experienced decreases in property and disorder crime because of the 
project. There were, however, increases in violent crime at one of the targeted Circle K 
stores. This crime type displacement is troublesome, especially when considering 
interventions should aim to “do no harm” (see: McCord, 2003). The increase in violent 
crime at only one store begs several questions, one being: How can criminologists weight 
offense type to better understand criminality at place, in order to tailor interventions to 
specific locations? 
The literature on convenience store crime susceptibility is extensive (e.g., 
Bellamy, 1996; Calder & Bauer, 1992; Crow & Bull, 1975; D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 
1990; Duffala, 1976; Erickson & Stenseth, 1996; Exum, Kuhns, Koch, & Johnson, 2010; 
Faulkner, Landsittel, & Hendricks, 2001; Hunter & Jeffrey, 1997; Petrosino & 
Brensilber, 2003; Petrosino, Fellow, & Brensilber, 1992; White & Katz, 2013). Whether 
convenience stores experience versatile offending or unique specialization in criminality 
is not fully understood, but certain crimes, like robbery, are overrepresented in the 
literature (e.g., Bellamy, 1996; Crow & Bull, 1975; D’Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1990; 
Duffala, 1976; Roesch & Winterdyk, 1986; White & Muldoon, 2015). This dissertation, 
however, found that property and disorder crimes were more likely to be affected by 
intervention efforts than violent crimes, like robbery, at most stores. Does the decrease in 
nonviolent crime “outweigh” the increase in violent crime, though? By taking into 
account the severity of the crimes occurring at these locations, interventionists can 
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address specific problems. This also relates to the aforementioned suggestion that 
problem-oriented policing improve its precision. For example, if CPTED measures 
decrease property crime but increase violent crime, contingent strategies can be put into 
place to immediately address the crime type displacement. Additionally, questions are 
raised about offenders’ perceived cost-benefit analysis of not only whether to commit a 
crime, but which crime type to commit. 
When thinking about varieties of criminal offending at convenience stores, the 
issue of weighting the offenses looms. In other words, “Is one homicide to be equated 
with 10 petty thefts? 100? 1,000?” (Merton, 1961, p. 703). The solution to this statistical 
dilemma is to address the seriousness, unidimensionality, frequency, and additivity of 
offending (Sweeten, 2012, p. 534). A review of a century of theoretical and empirical 
research on criminal offending scales found that, of the available means to sum multi-
item frequency or categorical measures of offending, variety scales are the preferred 
method because they possess high reliability, validity, and are unbiased by an 
overrepresentation of non-serious crimes (Sweeten, 2012). Sweeten (2012) posits that a 
relatively recent method, item response theory (IRT), is most closely related to variety 
scales in estimation.32 Sweeten (2012) also contends that: 
IRT models attempt to scale a latent trait that accounts for the observed response 
patterns. It is not unreasonable to call this latent trait ‘‘criminality,’’ indicating 
that variety of offending is more strongly correlated with criminality than 
frequency or volume of offending. (p. 548) 
 
                                                        
32 Because IRT can only model items as dichotomous indicators, examining 25 crime 
types for 74 stores at 70 time points would be arduous. Alternatively, a simpler option 
would be to employ Sellin and Wolfgang’s (1964) seriousness scaling. See Collins 
(1988) for a discussion of the limitations of Sellin-Wolfgang crime seriousness scores. 
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Using a refined item response theory approach, recent research has found that 
specialization is stable over time and is associated with significant and consistent 
explanatory variables (Osgood & Schreck, 2007). Convenience stores share unique 
characteristics (explanatory variables) that contribute to their crime susceptibility: 
operation hours, interior store layout, exterior store environment, location, type, 
ownership and security procedures, staff number, cash-control procedures, and incident 
response policies (Altizio & York, 2007). The current emphasis in item response theory, 
and crime specialization literature more broadly, focuses on individual-level criminality. 
The extant knowledge on crime and place mirrors that of individual-level research in an 
important way: a small percentage of people, like places, account for a large majority of 
crime (Sherman et al., 1989; Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972). Future research should 
expand the current understanding of item response theory to include place-based 
criminality. This would greatly increase the theoretical and practical usefulness of this 
measurement theory. 
Policy Implications 
 The results of this dissertation support the effectiveness of problem-oriented 
policing in reducing crime. One store that received the intervention arguably became 
“worse”, though, and saw an increase in violence-related calls for service. Cooperation 
with the police and research partners was notably varied among the store managers, with 
compliance being a crucial aspect of the project’s success. This noncompliance 
undoubtedly affected some of the SPI findings, and can be interpreted as willful 
negligence on behalf of the place manager. One promising policy implication related to 
crime reduction efforts at place is the implementation of regulatory approaches to 
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business misconduct. Additionally, it is imperative to address the methodological 
limitations of the study in order to strengthen future problem-oriented policing projects. 
This can be done via coercive grant funding that favors methodologically rigorous 
designs. 
A Regulatory Approach to Crime at Circle K 
Typically, it has been assumed that offender-centric policies should be the focus 
of government efforts to reduce crime, and that it is a governmental obligation to bear the 
full cost of crime fighting (Eck & Eck, 2012). Eck and Eck (2012) challenged these 
assumptions by putting forth a regulatory approach to expand crime reduction options. 
This regulatory approach to crime at place shifts the burden of blame and responsibility 
to the corporation (Circle K), instead of the government (i.e., the police). Additionally, a 
place-based focus requires consideration of the morality of crime facilitation by third 
parties (rather than simply a matter between offenders and police) (Eck & Eck, 2012). In 
other words, is Circle K’s noncompliance and uncooperative behavior throughout the 
Glendale POP project indicative of criminal culpability? 
Corporate malfeasance, or white-collar crime, can take the form of willful 
negligence. Debating if white-collar crime can even be viewed as crime, Sutherland 
(1945) acknowledges that the proof and evidence used to ascertain if corporate 
malfeasance occurred differs from that used in judgments of street, or “typical”, crime. 
Sutherland furthers that this differential implementation of the law can be explained by 
“the status of the business man, the trend away from punishment, and the relatively 
unorganized resentment of the public against white collar criminals” (1945, p. 137). 
Additionally, the assertion persists that “white collar crimes are merely technical 
  114 
violations and involve no moral culpability” (Sutherland, 1945, p. 139). If a business is 
repeatedly informed that their willful negligence is directly contributing to persistent and 
pervasive crime, however, that business (and specifically the people in control of that 
business’ actions) are morally, and potentially legally, responsible to act. The criminal 
blameworthiness then shifts from the person soliciting drugs in the Circle K parking lot, 
to the corporation for failing to remove pay phones, improve lighting outside of the store, 
and cooperate with police departments trying to keep customers and store employees 
safe. 
A recent systematic review of corporate crime deterrence found that regulatory 
policy produced a deterrent impact at the company level, and that multiple treatment 
deterrence strategies were significant at the individual and company level (Schell-Busey, 
Simpson, Rorie, & Alper, 2016). The review suggests that because corporate crime is 
behaviorally varied and complex, a pulling levers approach is appropriate (Schell-Busey 
et al., 2016). A multi-pronged response was used for the intervention evaluated in this 
dissertation, and it was successful in reducing crime. At the company level it is difficult 
to ascertain if crime-reduction efforts will persist, because as White and Katz (2013) 
noted, stores were resistant to changes that required a monetary investment. Monetary 
sanctions are one avenue that could logically be expected to then induce corporate 
compliance. 
Environmental regulatory policy provides a guide for our understanding of what a 
regulatory approach at convenience stores would look like. Corporations have been found 
to under-report their environmental violations offenses (Telle, 2013). Encouragingly, 
businesses that engage in self-reporting of regulatory violations are more willing to 
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cooperate (Helland, 1998). Often in the enforcement of environmental policies, the 
motives of the regulated and the regulator are not aligned (Oestreich, 2013). With both 
parties attempting to conserve resources, the effectiveness of the design and enforcement 
of these regulations is called into question (Oestreich, 2013). Though audits may be 
expensive to conduct and carry out, the threat of inspection has been found to reduce 
corporate violations (Telle, 2009). Many environmental protection agencies choose 
auditing as an enforcement method, over, for example, capping emissions (Telle, 2009). 
Randomly auditing Circle K locations should induce compliance with suggested crime-
reduction measures; asking individuals or corporations to police themselves is 
unreasonable, but this method reduces excessive burden on the police. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency enforces their regulatory 
policies via compliance assistance, incentives, monitoring, and enforcement tools (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, 2014). The formal structure of certain 
monitoring programs lacks elements of support and hope (Gable & Gable, 2005). The 
first response employed in the Glendale SPI employed these concepts. The intervention 
with Circle K leadership included demonstrating that convenience store crime was not 
just a problem in the city of Glendale (White & Katz, 2013). Following a graduated 
sanctions model, these elements should remain incorporated throughout the process even 
as enforcement begins. Responsive regulation requires engagement and collaboration 
with stakeholders, while simultaneously having the capacity to enforce sanctions 
(Braithwaite, 2011). Determining what these sanctions should be requires a careful 
consideration of the convenience store in question, and could vary by dominant offense 
type, or prior compliance. For example, in 2011 Mesa, Arizona passed an ordinance to 
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address convenience store crime, primarily targeting convenience stores with the highest 
calls for service (see: http://mesaaz.gov/home/showdocument?id=12748). The identified 
convenience stores were required to implement several security measures (e.g., changes 
to store design, posting “no trespassing” signs, etc.), provide employee safety training, 
increase general safety conditions (increased lighting for outdoor payphones, remove 
graffiti within 48 hours, secure alcoholic beverages, etc.), maintain surveillance cameras, 
and so on. The ordinance implemented graduated sanctions that ranged from warning 
storeowners and managers about violations, to enhanced monetary sanctions. The 
ordinance was deemed effective due to a decrease in calls for service at crime-prone 
convenience stores, while simultaneously encouraging increased communication between 
law enforcement and place managers. 
Scholars often examine deterrence-based practices to determine the optimal 
dosage required. For example, Koper (1995) ascertained that police patrol stops should be 
between 11 to 15 minutes to maximize police presence (i.e., deterrence). If police spend 
more than 15 minutes at crime hot spots, diminishing returns set in. Environmental 
regulation has yet to determine a monetary amount that will yield maximum deterrent 
effects, reinforcing the utility of considering non-monetary enforcement strategies, too 
(Rousseau & Telle, 2010). White and Katz (2013) led a public shaming effort aimed at 
Circle K, which ultimately led them to reinvest in the POP project’s goals. This was a 
nonmonetary sanction that could be reintroduced if a store exceeds a certain amount of 
monthly calls for service. One plausible monetary enforcement strategy, for example, 
would involve determining the cost of making proposed CPTED changes at convenience 
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stores, and then levying sanctions that exceed the cost of compliance. These sanctions 
could increase, using a graduated strategy, if violations continue. 
Industrial compliance is often induced through targeting (Helland, 1998). This 
strategy of regulatory enforcement divides corporations into those with a history of 
violations, and those that comply. Targeting has been used to monitor tax compliance 
(Landsberger & Meilijson, 1982), industrial safety (Scholz, 1991), environmental 
protection (Harrington, 1988; Harford & Harrington, 1991), and many other sectors. 
Businesses with a history of regulatory noncompliance are to be targeted for inspection 
more frequently, according to this model, and theoretically the violator will begin 
cooperating with the regulator due to the high costs of inspection (Helland, 1998). Again, 
these costs may be monetary, or in the form of perceived social capital. Looking at 
deterrence spillover effects of environmental enforcement, Shimshack and Ward (2005) 
found that fines for pollutant violations reduced violations statewide the following year. 
That is, there is a diffusion of benefits when sanctioning violators. In fact, “tightened 
regulation is seen as a stimulator of investment, consequently acting as a catalyst for 
innovation” (McEvoy, Gibbs, & Longhurst, 2000, p. 36). It is not unreasonable to think 
that having Circle K make corporation-wide changes once could continually decrease 
crime for months or years to follow, with the added strong potential of increasing their 
revenue. 
To conclude, the police cannot be everywhere and do everything; their 
functionality and effectiveness would suffer. “A cardinal principle for the understanding 
of police organization and activity is that the police are only one among many agencies of 
social control” (Banton, 1964, p. 1). Outsourcing to private companies might be a viable 
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enforcement option, though (Millie, 2013). One strategy in this vein would be to include 
insurance companies in the regulation process. Corporations file insurance claims for lost 
revenue, and in the case of Circle K lost revenue includes unchecked theft of their 
products. These insurance companies can either cap their payouts at a certain number of 
claims, or refuse reimbursement altogether if convenience stores willfully disregard 
crime reduction suggestions. 
Insurance companies have been used in this way before as an accountability 
device. In the 1980’s, insurance companies would not offer police departments 
reasonably priced coverable unless those departments demonstrated that they had taken 
all necessary precautions to avoid exposure to lawsuits (McCoy, 2010). In fact, McCoy 
(2010) credits the actions of private insurance industries with being largely responsible 
for improving American policing in the past several decades. Similarly, a regulatory 
framework applied to convenience stores would substantially expand the repertoire of 
crime reduction and prevention strategies available to police, while producing cost-
effective policy measures. 
Funding for Research: Encouraging Experimental Design 
 In the most recent systematic review of problem-oriented policing, the dearth of 
experimental design in these projects was revealed. This is a problem for the evidence-
base for several related reasons: the continual use of nonexperimental designs in 
problem-oriented policing limits understanding of the paradigms’ causal mechanisms, 
and statistical issues associated with quasi-experimental design, such as selection bias, 
inhibit the reliability and internal validity of intervention findings. As Braga (2010) 
notes: 
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Much of the academic work on problem-oriented policing seeks to improve 
practice by refining key steps in the process such as encouraging the in-depth 
analysis of problems and searching for innovative responses that go beyond 
traditional enforcement. Unfortunately, although these academics press 
practitioners to conduct more rigorous assessments of implemented prevention 
strategies, they also tend to be dismissive of the use of more rigorous research 
designs, such as randomized controlled trials, in evaluating the crime prevention 
efforts of problem-oriented policing initiatives. This apparent bias against more 
rigorous research designs is certainly a contributing factor to the weak scientific 
evidence base for the problem-oriented policing approach. Beyond increasing the 
openness of problem-oriented policing scholars to include stronger research 
designs, investments need to be made to develop strong working relationships 
with police practitioners so that opportunities can be created to conduct more 
rigorous evaluations. (pp. 173-174) 
 
There is a disconnect between the moral imperative to use the most rigorous 
research design available (Boruch, 1975; Weisburd, 2003), and the controversy 
associated with creating treatment and control conditions (Braga, 2010). This is a reality 
of criminological fieldwork – researchers are not in a position to solely dictate and 
demand the parameters of an intervention. With a better understanding of research 
design, policy-makers, practitioners, and funders might demand higher quality 
evaluations – specifically, randomized experiments (Farrington, 2003). For example, BJA 
now makes more funding decisions in SPI and other programs based, in part, on the rigor 
of the research design in the proposal. Additionally, in recognizing the importance of 
rigorous methodological designs and qualified research partners, BJA also now requires 
20% of budget proposals be allotted to the research partner. As an illustration, BJA 
funded seven new sites in 2016; four of which are employing randomized controlled 
trials. The research partners for these funded sites include: Urban Institute, RAND, Barak 
Ariel, University of South Florida, and George Mason University (M. White, personal 
communication, March 22, 2016). 
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Because timing might be the most important factor when working with 
practitioners (Petersilia, 2008), multiple waves of graduated funding should be made 
available semi-annually to agencies and researchers. Hopefully, this will remove timing 
constraints as a reason for the implementation of less rigorous intervention design. The 
graduated funding should reflect a tiered system wherein more rigorous research designs 
reflect maximum funding potential. Lastly, implementing an incentive-based funding 
structure like this will still allow for problem-oriented policing to be evaluated with a 
variety of research methodologies, but will encourage the use of randomized controlled 
trials.  
 Policing scholars have identified the shortcomings associated with shallow 
problem-solving, and the incomplete implementation of the SARA model. Still, weak 
implementations produce noted crime reductions (Braga & Weisburd, 2006). Improving 
POP and growing its evidence-base will require a novel policy approach that moves 
beyond correctly following the paradigm put forth by Goldstein (1979). The evidence-
based policing movement advocates for the use of research to inform police practice, by 
disseminating studies with strong scientific rigor. The above funding strategy is one 
method that can be used to ensure that projects properly implementing the SARA model, 
like the project in this dissertation, are made statistically stronger in future replications. 
Indeed, the positive findings in this dissertation may be tied to the robustness of the 
SARA model in the Glendale POP initiative. There were several core elements to this 
thorough undertaking: researcher involvement from start to finish, advanced training, 
continuous problem analysis, progressive leadership, and line-officer buy-in (whereby the 
officers identified the convenience store problem and devised the responses). Including 
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these key components in incentive-based funding decisions will further strengthen the 
sustainable, cost-effective potential of problem-oriented policing. 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation statistically demonstrated the promising effects of problem-
oriented policing on crime. The implementation of the project should be used as a guide 
for future projects seeking to follow the SARA paradigm thoroughly, in order to 
implement POP as originally envisioned by Herman Goldstein. This project’s robust 
implementation likely contributed to the sustainability of results, as well as the observed 
diffusion of benefits, and should serve as an example of the long-term potential of 
problem-oriented policing efforts. Additionally, unexpected findings related to crime type 
displacement provide interesting avenues for future research on better understanding 
crime specialization at place. Not without limitations, future studies should strengthen the 
methodological design when replicating this project and seek to flesh out the potential 
precision of problem-oriented policing strategies more generally. Contextualizing this 
project in the current state of policing poses a dilemma, though: Why is this project 
noteworthy, when the police are undergoing a professional crisis? 
External pressure to change, in the form of riots or scandals for example, can 
prompt transformation in a police department and increase susceptibility to evidence-
based practices (Sherman, 2015). Now is the time to encourage police departments to 
implement research-based practices, to increase both their effectiveness and community 
relationships: pillars emphasized in the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
(2015). Partnering with research institutions is one indication of understanding by police 
that thorough, just, and effective community-based strategies are the future of the 
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profession. The Task Force recommends the police first build trust and legitimacy by 
reinstating a guardian mindset (2015). To potentially quell national unrest the police 
should continually legitimize their work in ways that indicate their willingness to protect 
the communities they serve. This dissertation provides an example of the police working 
with community stakeholders to reduce crime, without placing undue burden on local 
citizens, in innovative ways. By shifting the crime-fighting focus to criminogenic places, 
law enforcement agencies can promote non-enforcement strategies – a Task Force 
recommendation designed to increase individual legitimacy perceptions. Proactive, 
evidence-based policing efforts in this vein will improve community engagement and 
cooperation with police, while simultaneously altering understanding of the police 
mission. 
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